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ABSTRACT
What happens after an international court finds a state has violated
international law? Many realize today that states often fail to comply with
such judgments. International courts like the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”) have to rely on the help of Non-Governmental
Organizations (“NGOs”) to shame states into compliance. In 2011, the body
charged with enforcing judgments of the ECHR launched a new website
dedicated to publishing reports by NGOs that criticize states for
noncompliance with ECHR judgments. This website published hundreds of
reports, as well as the responses of some accused states. The Article analyzes
all the reports published in the first four years since the website was created.
This analysis, together with interviews with many of the NGO lawyers
involved, sheds light on the way reputational sanctions work in international
law. It reveals that NGOs focus most of their attention on legally important
cases and on cases that address severe violations. It also shows that NGOs
focus on states that usually comply with their international obligations
instead of on states that regularly fail to comply with international law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (“CM”) is the
body charged with enforcing judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”). Although the CM is theoretically able to expel a state
from the Council of Europe, it has never done so and cannot credibly threaten
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to use this extreme step. To convince states to comply with ECHR
judgments, the CM must rely on publicly shaming the states by exposing
their defiant behavior in its discussions and in public documents it releases,
which are known as “interim resolutions.” As the number of disobeyed
judgments increased, the CM was pushed to devise a new strategy to make
states comply.
This strategy was the creation in 2011 of a website dedicated to
publishing reports1 by Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”). The

1. It is important to stress that NGOs began filing reports long before the DEJ website was created;
they have been filing since May 2006 when Rule 9 was amended and allowed them to intervene. Yet
these reports were not transparent and accessible to the public unless NGOs deliberately published them
on their own websites or in publications. See, e.g., RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE, IMPLEMENTATION
RESOURCES AND MATERIALS, http://www.srji.org/en/implementation/materials/ [https://perma.cc/G7HB
-TE4Y]. Reports that do not appear on the DEJ website are excluded from the analysis here.
All reports were downloaded from the Council of Europe online database. Council of Europe, Latest
Documents, http://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/latest-documents [https://perma.cc/X7ES-N88D] (reports
originally accessed on Dec. 4 2014 from the previous version of this website,
http://www.coe.int/t/cm/System/WCDsearch.asp?ShowRes=yes&FilingPlan=fplCM-Supervision9_2&
Language=lanEnglish&ShowBreak=yes&SortBy=Geo&Sector=secCM&ShowFullTextSearch=yes&
ResultTitle=Information%20from%20NGOs%20and%20National%20human%20rights%20institutions). This database keeps reports also on judgments that were closed by the CM, including some of the
cases analyzed here. In addition, on Oct. 31, 2013, all reports were downloaded from another part of the
website, which contains all communications received on pending cases: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monito
ring/execution/Themes/Add_info/Info_cases_en.asp [https://perma.cc/MQT5-VUHQ]. While cases
could be closed and would not appear on the second website, as were some cases in the sample, they
continue to appear on the first, specialized website that should contain all reports. Yet, some reports are
missing from the first website, although they appeared on the second website. These were included in my
sample to give the most accurate picture of the reports actually filed and accessible on at least one CM
website. Almost all of them are reports issued in the infancy of the website in 2010 or 2011 and may have
been unintentionally omitted from the specialized first website. The number of these missing reports are
(2010)410, (2010)407, (2010)398, (2011)698, (2010)336, (2011)298, (2011)680, (2013)380, (2011)787,
(2010)610. All ten reports concern cases that were still pending on Jan. 28, 2015.
Another oddity worth mentioning are three reports dating from 2007–2008 against France that were
later published in the first website although they were clearly filed long before the website was created
together with many other cases that were never published. These reports are (2007)600, (2007)531,
(2008)119, which all address the same case: app. no. 25389/05 Gaberamadhien v. France. Even an official
at ANAFE, the organization that filed the three reports, could not tell why they were published so late
after they were filed while similar reports were not. See Conversation with Official at ANAFE
(Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers) on 27/5/15. These reports were
included in the database to give the most accurate picture of the CM website.
All information about the current status of the cases in the CM and communications filed regarding
them was coded or updated in December 2014 and January 2015. This information was collected from
queries at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp and from data
on resolutions and documents filed taken from other places in the CM’s website.
The CM now has a new and elegant website at http://www.coe.int/cs/web/execution/submissions.
One can find there information about submissions by states, applicants, NGOs, and national human rights
institutions (NHRIs) categorized by the relevant state. One can access specifically information submitted
by NGOs and NHRIs at https://search.coe.int/cm#title=Information% 20from%20NGOs%20and%20nati
onal%20human%20rights%20institutions#showSearchBar=static#k=*#f=%5B%7B%22p%22%3A%22
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reports accuse states of failing to fully comply with judgments of the ECHR.
They are published promptly, together with any response from the state
accused of non-compliance. In this way, hundreds of organizations can
participate in exposing the non-compliant actions of states. NGOs can learn
about state behavior from each other, add their own observations in new
reports, and spread this information further in their publications.
From the creation of the website until December 2014, 266 NGO
reports were published, targeting compliance with 137 ECHR judgments.
This Article analyzes all these reports, along with information from
interviews with NGO activists who submitted them. The Article suggests
that NGOs focus mainly on cases of significant legal importance and on
issues that concern severe human rights violations. Furthermore, NGOs
focus on states that are usually compliant with international law—so-called
“high-reputation states.”
These findings shed light on the way reputational sanctions work in
international law. Apparently, allowing numerous NGOs that are very
different from each other to use shaming sanctions can help focus most of
the attention on the cases that matter the most legally and morally. Moreover,
states that have built a high reputation through years of good behavior are
shamed more often than regularly misbehaving states. The reason for this
seems to be that states which acquired a good reputation have more to lose
from accusations of inadequate behavior. They are, therefore, more likely to
improve their behavior if their noncompliance is exposed. This, in turn, gives
NGOs an incentive to target these high-reputation states instead of wasting
efforts on states that do not care much about their reputation.
Scholars have noted that once an international court issues a judgment,
state compliance is not guaranteed. In fact, compliance can be partial or
delayed.2 This Article adds to this literature. It joins those scholars who argue
that the level of state compliance often depends on the actions of individuals
and organizations interacting with the government of that state.3 NGOs play

CoEFilter%22%2C%22i%22%3A1%2C%22o%22%3A1%2C%22m%22%3A0%2C%22ix%22%3A1
%2C%22value%22%3A%22Information%20from%20NGOs%20%26%20National%20HR%20instituti
ons%20(Rule%209.2)%22%7D%5D [https://perma.cc/QTZ6-48MQ].
2. See Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 437, 443–45 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, &
Yuval Shany eds., 2013) (explaining the difficulties of measuring state compliance with international
judgments and referring to empirical studies of compliance); YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 120–23 (2014) (studying the factors that affect compliance
with international judgments).
3. See COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 135 (2014) (arguing that domestic actors are essential for
securing compliance with human rights judgments of international courts).
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an important role in this regard,4 but they are constrained by their limited
abilities5 and their intervention does not necessarily have a positive effect.6
Therefore, to fulfill its goal of enforcing ECHR judgments, the CM must be
sensitive to the complex reality unfolded in this Article.7
Part I describes the ECHR and the CM, with special emphasis on the
new website where NGOs can publish reports on states’ noncompliance. Part
II shows which types of judgments attract the most NGO attention. Part III
presents the type of states that are the subject of increased NGO attention.
Part IV offers data about the NGOs involved in filing reports, including
insights from a series of interviews with NGO activists. Part V explores
potential reasons for inaccuracies in the way the international community
perceives states’ reputations and suggests that the involvement of NGOs may
improve the community’s reputational assessments. Part VI concludes by
highlighting how the Article’s findings lend empirical support to a key
argument made in the literature on reputation—that high-reputation states
stand to lose more than low-reputation states when targeted by a reputational
sanction.
I. THE ECHR AND ITS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
A. The ECHR
The ECHR is an international human rights court located in Strasbourg,
France. It has jurisdiction over violations of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms8 (the
“Convention”) committed by the forty-seven member states comprising the
Council of Europe. The Convention protects key human rights such as the
right to life and the right to freedom from torture,9 as well as numerous other
4. See id. at 24 (arguing that NGOs can pressure governments and shame them into compliance
with international judgments).
5. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by
an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 67–68 (2004) (asserting that shaming
by NGOs is effective mainly when the violation, the identity of the violator, and the necessary remedy
are clear).
6. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 707 (2008) (showing that countries which are shamed for
human rights abuses often improve their protection of political rights; however, shaming sometimes leads
to increased political terror).
7. See Başak Çali & Anne Koch, Foxes Guarding the Foxes? The Peer Review of Human Rights
Judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 324 (2014)
(suggesting that CM procedures improve the prospects of compliance with ECHR judgments).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocols No. 3 (Sept. 21, 1970), 5 (Dec. 20, 1971), 8 (Jan. 1, 1990), 11
(Nov. 1, 1998), and 14 (June 1, 2010) [hereinafter The Convention].
9. Id. at arts. 2 and 3, respectively.
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rights such as the right to a fair trial, to privacy, and to freedom of religion.10
The Convention also requires states to provide effective remedies for any
violation and not to discriminate between individuals.11
Individuals, groups, and NGOs can bring cases to the ECHR as
applicants if they were victims of violations.12 States can also bring cases
against other states even if they were not victims of violations,13 but they
rarely do so.14 The ECHR employs forty-seven permanent judges—one
judge for each state in the Council of Europe.15 The court sits in panels of
various sizes: single-judge Formations, Committees of three judges,
Chambers of seven judges and a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.16 Most
of the ECHR’s significant cases are issued by Chambers, with the Grand
Chamber reserved only for issues of extreme legal importance.17
Over the years, the number of cases reaching the ECHR has skyrocketed. While the court received 45,000 cases in the first forty-three years
of its existence,18 in 2013 alone it received more than 65,000 cases.19 To
address this flood of cases, the ECHR has undergone several reforms. In
1998, the commission previously responsible for screening cases before they
reached the ECHR was abolished,20 and in 2010, single-judge Formations

10. Id. at arts. 6, 8, and 9, respectively.
11. Id. at arts. 13 and 14, respectively.
12. Id. at art. 34.
13. Id. at art. 33.
14. See Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 372 (2009) (arguing that more than
ninety-five percent of the cases brought before the court were not applications by states).
15. Every state in the Council of Europe can suggest a list of three candidates to the parliamentary
assembly from which the assembly selects one judge. See The Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 20, 22.
16. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 27.
17. A Chamber that received a case may decide to pass the case to a Grand Chamber if it finds the
case raises a serious question of interpretation, or if the case might lead to a digression from prior
judgments. If the Chamber issues a judgment, it does not become immediately final. Within three months
after the Chamber judgment, a party to the dispute can, in exceptional cases, ask for a referral to the Grand
Chamber. A panel of five judges will allow the case to be heard again by a Grand Chamber if the case
raises a significant issue of interpretation or an issue of great importance. If three months have passed
since the Chamber judgment and neither party has requested a referral, if both parties have declared they
do not wish to refer the case, or if the court has decided to reject a referral request, the Chamber judgment
will become final. See The Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 30–31, 42–44.
18. From 1955 to 1998, 45,000 applications were allocated to judicial formations. See EUR. CT.
H.R., ANNUAL REPORT 2009 11 (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401BC9B-F58D015E4D54/0/2009_Annual_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VKM-QLFR].
19. In 2013, 65,900 applications were allocated to judicial formations. See EUR. CT. H.R.,
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013 4 (Jan. 2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2013_
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DZK-QW5K].
20. In Protocol 11, which was accepted on November 1, 1998.

DOTHAN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

A VIRTUAL WALL OF SHAME

3/10/2017 12:11 PM

147

were authorized to reject plainly inadmissible cases.21 Consequently, the
ECHR processes an increasingly large volume of cases. In 2013, it disposed
of more than 93,000 cases, reducing the court’s accumulated backlog to
slightly less than 100,000.22
ECHR judgments finding states in violation of the Convention are
legally binding. States must comply with these judgments by choosing the
appropriate means to remedy the violation.23 These means can range from
specific measures such as releasing prisoners to general measures such as
amending statutes.24 If parties harmed by violations have not been
compensated by the state’s domestic laws, the ECHR can grant them “just
satisfaction,” which are reparations to cover their harms.
The ECHR cannot enforce its judgments. This task is left entirely to the
CM. Though some scholars argue that states regularly comply with ECHR
judgments,25 many are concerned that a large number of the cases reaching
the court are in fact repetitive cases—cases arising from structural defects
that were not resolved and continue to harm numerous applicants. To better
address these structural defects, the court occasionally issues so-called “pilot
judgments”—judgments that prescribe specific actions to remedy the
violation.26
B. The Committee of Ministers
The CM monitors compliance with the ECHR’s judgments together
with the Department of Execution of Judgments (“DEJ”).27 These bodies are
charged with supervising both the individual measures necessary to amend a
violation vis-à-vis the applicant, including the payment of just satisfaction,
and the general measures necessary to prevent similar violations, such as
constitutional or statutory amendments. Theoretically, the CM can expel
states from the Council of Europe, but this severe measure has never been

21. In Protocol 14, which came into force on June 1, 2010. Protocol 14 also allows three-judge
Committees to declare admissible and decide on the merits cases that are clearly well-founded.
Furthermore, the Protocol allows the court to declare cases inadmissible if they create no significant
disadvantage to the applicant and do not raise an important legal question.
22. In 2013, 93,396 applications were processed. This reduced the court’s backlog from 128,100
cases at the beginning of the year to 99,900 cases at its end. See ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013, supra
note 19, at 4.
23. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 46.
24. See Scozzari and Guinta v. Italy [GC], 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471.
25. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L.
115, 119 (2011) (presenting the research on compliance rates with the ECHR and arguing that by most
accounts compliance rates are high).
26. See Broniowski v. Poland [GC], 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
27. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 46(2).
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used.28 In practice, the CM therefore limits itself to spreading information
and shaming states into compliance.
After a final judgment is issued against a state, the DEJ begins to
negotiate with the state about how to remedy the violation. After this initial
stage, which should last no more than six months, the state is required to
submit an “action report.” The report describes the measures the state took
to comply and a timeline for the measures it intends to take. If a state does
not comply quickly enough, the CM may examine its actions regularly and
request that the state act in certain ways. If the state continues to delay
compliance, the CM may issue a public proclamation called “interim
resolution” condemning the state for noncompliance and urging it to change
its practices.29
The CM divides its efforts of supervision into two separate tracks. Most
cases are directed to the track called “standard procedure.” Some cases that
need closer attention, such as cases that require urgent action or involve
severe structural problems, are directed to the “enhanced procedure” track.
Cases supervised under this “enhanced procedure” are regularly raised in the
CM meetings.30
The CM categorizes cases that deal with general wide-spread
problems—and consequently require general measures of remediation—as
“Leading Cases.”31 The CM supervises compliance with a Leading Case
together with the repetitive cases that result from the same violation.
In 2011, the DEJ created a website that publishes all the information
about states’ compliance, including action reports submitted by the states and
interim resolutions issued against them. This new source of information
allows civil society to monitor states’ compliance behavior and shape states’
reputations.

28. See Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 8, 5 May 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (stating that the CM
may suspend the representation rights of states that violate their commitment to the Council of Europe or
even expel such states from the Council). While no state has been expelled under this provision, Greece
withdrew from the Council of Europe in 1969 under a possible threat of expulsion. See Dothan, supra
note 25, at 119, 139.
29. Lucja Miara & Victoria Prais, The Role of Civil Society in the Execution of Judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 528, 531 (2012).
30. If the most crucial elements of compliance are completed, such cases might be downgraded to
“standard procedure.” In contrast, in cases of persistent noncompliance, a case might be upgraded from
“standard procedure” to “enhanced procedure.” See id. at 532.
31. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7TH ANN. REP. OF THE COMM. OF MINISTERS 33 (2013).
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C. Rule 9.2 Procedure
Rule 9.2 of the CM Rules allows the CM to consider communications
from NGOs and national institutions for the protection of human rights.32
Thus, NGOs are not only passive recipients of information. Rather, they can
share their own views about states’ compliance with the CM. The NGO
reports are sent to the state, which is given five days to respond to them if it
wishes. After five days, both the report and the state’s response, if there was
any, are promptly published on the DEJ’s website.33
The reports in the database analyzed in this Article were filed by over
two hundred NGOs of diverse characteristics and backgrounds. Surprisingly,
large and well-funded organizations such as Amnesty or Human Rights
Watch were responsible only for a few of the reports in the database.34 In
contrast, some reports were filed by organizations that are as specialized as
the Association of Pensioners of the Republic of Srpska.35
Many times, several NGOs participated in filing the same report, or in
filing several reports regarding the same judgment. While many judgments
drew reports from a single NGO,36 in one instance as many as fifty-five
NGOs were involved in filing reports regarding a single judgment.37
II. WHICH TYPES OF JUDGMENTS ATTRACT THE MOST NGO
ATTENTION?
The reputation of states reflects the beliefs of the international
community about their practices. These beliefs evolve based on accusations
targeting the states by foreign governments, courts, and other actors such as
NGOs. The DEJ website is only one arena where states are publicly shamed
for their practices. Nevertheless, much can be learned about the incentives
and strategy of NGOs from how they use this arena. The strategy NGOs
employ may carry through to other arenas as well, such as their own media
publications and their discussions.
In order to decipher how NGOs divide their attention, two methods of
analyzing the relevant data are used. The first method compares the 137
cases that led to NGO reports to the “general population” of cases—a sample
32. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, APPENDIX 4: RULES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FOR THE
SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND OF THE TERMS OF FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT, RULE
9.2 (2006).
33. Lucja Miara & Victoria Prais, supra note 29, at 534, 536.
34. For further analysis, see infra Part II.A.
35. See Karanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 39462/03, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Fourth
Section), not reported.
36. For additional detail, see infra Part II.
37. Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40984/07, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (First Section) (unpublished).
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consisting of all the Chamber and Grand Chamber Judgments38 issued in
English39 from January 1, 200840 to October 31, 201341 in which the ECHR
found at least one violation and which are not part of the group of cases that
led to NGO reports. In this sample, the court found 7,847 violations42 in a
total of 5,584 judgments. Comparing the judgments that led to NGO reports
with the judgments from the general population will help determine if NGOs
tend to file reports especially on issues of a certain type.
The second method sorts cases that led to NGO reports according to the
amount of attention they received. This method relies on three proxies for
special NGO attention: the number of reports filed,43 the number of NGOs
38. The first method employed involved a comparison between the number of cases that did lead to
NGO reports and the number of cases that did not lead to NGO reports. The latter number is the total
sample size of cases described less the cases that led to NGO reports. Only one (0.73%) of the cases that
led to NGO reports was issued by a court committee. Since committee judgments typically accompany
more technical cases that have become common only in recent years due to structural changes initiated
by Protocol 14, they were excluded from the group.
39. While some judgments do not have a full English language version on HUDOC, all judgments
have their case details coded in English as well. These details appear when English documents are
searched, assuring that all the judgments issued by the ECHR at this period are represented in the sample.
40. Of the 137 cases that led to NGO reports, only thirty-four judgments became final (Grand
Chamber judgments are final immediately, Chamber judgments become final three months after they are
issued if no referral to the Grand Chamber was requested; see art. 44 to the Convention) before Jan. 1,
2008, with the earliest becoming final on Oct. 30, 1998. The Oct. 30, 1998 judgment is the only judgment
that became final before Protocol 11 came into force on Nov. 1, 1998. Only nine cases became final
before Jan. 1, 2005. Although the number of applications filed per year increased rapidly between Nov.
1998 and 2008, there was no procedural change in the court at this period and no reason to believe that
older judgments, especially the judgments issued only a couple of years before 2008, differ systematically
from judgments in the general population.
41. All 137 cases that led to NGO reports became final before Oct. 31, 2013. The most recent case
became final on Oct. 21, 2013.
42. According to a HUDOC coding of violations of articles mentioned in Table 1 of this Article.
Many judgments contain more than one violation. In my data and in the HUDOC database, several
violations of the same article in the same judgment are counted as one violation.
43. There are large differences in the amount of attention NGOs devoted to judgments, even when
they did file a report: 67.15% of the judgments that led to NGO reports led to only 1 NGO report; 24.82%
led to 2-4 NGO reports; 5.11% led to 5-10 NGO reports; and only 2.92% led to 11 or more NGO reports.
Some reports involved several NGOs and often the same NGO submitted many reports. In total, 92 of the
judgments led to only 1 NGO report, 34 judgments led to 2-4 NGO reports, 7 judgments led to 5-10 NGO
reports, and 4 judgments led to 11 or more NGO reports. A few unique cases attracted the extreme
attention of NGOs. For example, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, is the only
case issued against the Czech Republic that led to NGO reports and yet it attracted no less than seventeen
reports involving ten different NGOs. The case also attracted a report by the Public Defender of Rights—
a national human rights institution. Just as unique is the fact that nine NGOs participated as third parties
in the application itself, yet none of them are included in the group of NGOs that filed a report later on.
In addition, sometimes one NGO report addresses several judgments. To make the coding consistent,
only judgments mentioned in the formal title page of the report were coded. Usually the title page covers
all judgments actually addressed by the report, but in rare cases (for example, Report (2011)250 filed
against Bulgaria) the report itself mentions other judgments likely considered less important or less
relevant by the DEJ.
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involved,44 and the number of pages contained in all NGO reports.45 The
Article compares the fifty-four cases that led to “minimal” NGO attention—
only one report, filed by only one NGO, and holding no more than ten
pages—with the thirty-eight cases that drew “special” NGO attention—two
or more reports, filed by two or more NGOs, and holding at least eleven
pages. This comparison can reveal what issues NGOs focus on.
A. The Severity of the Violation
1. The Violated Right
One proxy for the severity of the violation is the type of right that was
infringed. Comparing the types of rights that were infringed in the general
population of cases and in the cases that led to NGO reports will reveal
whether NGOs submit reports on compliance with cases that found severe
violations or minor violations.
Table 1 shows the percentage of violations (the number of violations
found divided by the number of judgments) in the general population of
judgments and in the judgments that led to NGO reports.
Table 1: The Severity of Violations in the General Population and in
Cases that Led to NGO Reports

Article 2 - right to life
Article 3 - prohibition of torture
Article 4 - prohibition of slavery and
forced labor
Article 5 - right to liberty and security

Judgments In
the General
Population
6.64%
18.48%
0.05%
17.37%

Judgments Leading to
NGO Reports
13.14%
27.74%
0.73%
13.87%

44. The number of NGOs involved in applications regarding a specific case also varies greatly:
60.58% of the judgments led to applications involving only 1 NGO; 27.01% led to 2-3 NGOs involved;
6.57% led to 4-6 NGOs involved; 5.11% led to 7-10 NGOs involved; and another 0.73% led to 11 or
more NGOs involved. In total, 83 judgments led to applications involving only 1 NGO, 37 judgments led
to 2-3 NGOs involved, 9 judgments led to 4-6 NGOs involved, and 7 judgments led to 7-10 NGOs
involved. Only 1 judgment led to 11 or more NGOs involved.
45. There are also great differences in the length of the NGO reports submitted. Often NGOs attach
appendices to their reports including detailed factual backgrounds. Reports range from short letters to
detailed documents totaling dozens of pages: 4.38% of the judgments led to NGO reports totaling 3 pages
or less; 43.07% led to reports totaling between 4 and 10 pages; 17.52% led to reports totaling between 11
and 20 pages; 21.17% led to reports between 21 and 50 pages; and 13.87% led to reports as long or longer
than 51 pages (all figures include the introduction page attached by the Department of Enforcement of
Judgments and the response of the state, if there was one). In total, 6 judgments led to NGO reports
totaling 3 pages or less; 59 judgments led to reports totaling between 4 and 10 pages; 24 judgments led
to reports totaling between 11 and 20 pages; 29 judgments led to reports between 21 and 50 pages in
length; and 19 judgments led to reports as long or longer than 51 pages.
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Article 6 - right to a fair trial
Article 7 - no punishment without law
Article 8 - right to respect for private
and family life
Article 9 - freedom of thought,
conscience and religion
Article 10 - freedom of expression
Article 11 - freedom of assembly and
association
Article 12 - right to marry
Article 13 - right to an effective
remedy
Article 14 - prohibition of
discrimination
Protocol 1 Article 1 - protection of
property
Protocol 1 Article 2 - right to education
Protocol 1 Article 3 - right to free
elections
Protocol 4 - additional freedoms (of
movements, aliens, etc.)
Protocol 6 - abolition of the death
penalty
Protocol 7 - additional rights (for
appeals, aliens, etc.)
Protocol 12 - general right to equality
Protocol 13 - complete abolition of the
death penalty
Total Percentages

[Vol 27:141

54.15%
0.39%
8.72%

27.74%
0.73%
16.06%

0.56%

6.57%

4.14%
1.34%

7.30%
7.30%

0.07%
12.23%

0%
20.44%

2.01%

13.14%

13.75%

11.68%

0.11%
0.14%

5.84%
4.38%

0.18%

2.19%

0%

0%

0.18%

2.19%

0%
0%

0.73%
0%

140.51%

181.77%

Table 1 highlights several striking differences. Some of these
differences (bolded) may reveal that NGOs tend to focus on violations of
special severity according to the Convention article involved. A Two-Tailed
Fisher’s Exact Test was used to establish the statistical significance of these
differences. The same test was used throughout this Article.46 Most
importantly, there are more violations of Article 2 protecting the right to life
in the group of cases that led to NGO reports than in the general population
(13.14% as opposed to 6.64%).47 Table 1 also shows more violations of
Article 3’s prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in the group of
judgments that led to NGO reports than in the general population (27.74%

46. The Two-Tailed Fisher’s Exact Test for establishing statistical significance is especially useful
with small sample sizes and can calculate exact P values. The results throughout this Article were checked
by the author using GraphPad software available at http://graphpad.com/quickcalcs/contingency1.cfm
[https://perma.cc/6WQU-JSBU] (data on file with author).
47. P value of 0.0056 (indicating a statistically significant difference).
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as opposed to 18.48%).48 These differences are statistically significant.
Violations of Articles 2 and 3 are generally considered the most severe
violations under the ECHR’s jurisdiction, and states cannot derogate from
these Articles, even in times of emergency.49
Furthermore, there are more violations of Article 13 that concern failing
to supply victims with an effective remedy in the group of cases that led to
NGO reports than in the general population of judgments (20.44% as
opposed to 12.23%).50 An even greater difference between the two groups
concerns violations of Article 14 requiring states to give equal treatment
(13.14% as opposed to 2.01%).51 These differences are also statistically
significant. Applicants often accuse states of violating their rights under
Articles 13 or 14 in addition to the main violation covered by another article
of the Convention. Usually, the ECHR decides that finding an additional
violation besides the main violated article is unnecessary. But in rare cases
when the discrimination of the applicants is severe or when the state doesn’t
provide any good remedy, the ECHR finds a violation of these articles as
well. Accordingly, the existence of Article 13 and Article 14 violations can
serve as a good proxy for the existence of severe and pervasive human rights
violations.
The first method of analyzing the data finds significant differences
supporting the conclusion that NGOs usually file reports on more severe
cases. These are either cases that deal with the most severe types of human
rights violations or cases that reveal additional problems, such as
discrimination or a lack of an effective remedy for the violation. The second
method of analysis can also be used here. However, the data about NGO
attention in cases in which at least one NGO report was filed isn’t conclusive
regarding some of the articles examined. It only suggests that NGOs focus
special attention on violations that are severe due to the discrimination they
entail between social groups, and therefore involve an Article 14 violation.52
48. P value of 0.0102 (indicating a statistically significant difference).
49. See The Convention, supra note 8 at art. 15(2); see also Natasa Mavronicola, What is an Absolute Right? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 12 HUM. RTS L. REV. 723, 757 (2012) (arguing that Article 3 protects an absolute right that states
cannot digress from regardless of the implications).
50. P value of 0.0081 (indicating a statistically significant difference).
51. P value of less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference).
52. Cases that drew minimal NGO attention included 18.52% of Article 2 violations, 24.07% of
Article 3 violations, 18.52% of Article 13 violations, and 5.56% of Article 14 violations. Cases that drew
special NGO attention included 10.53% of Article 2 violations, 34.21% of Article 3 violations, 28.95%
of Article 13 violations, and 26.32% of Article 14 violations. Unexpectedly, therefore, there are more
Article 2 violations in cases that drew minimal NGO attention than in cases that drew special NGO
attention. Yet this difference is not statistically significant (P value of 0.3828). Although there seem to
be more Article 3 and Article 13 violations in cases that drew special NGO attention, the differences
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2. Just Satisfaction
Another proxy for the severity of the violation is the “just satisfaction”
granted by the court. Just satisfaction compensates the applicant only for
harms that will not be redressed by compliance with the court’s decree. As a
result, it is not a perfect proxy for the severity of the violation. Some
violations may be very severe and lead to great harm if continued, such as
an unjustified arrest, but will lead to small amounts of compensation for
damage already incurred. In other cases, the ECHR may address violations
involving economic issues that do not raise acute human rights concerns but
nonetheless lead to high sums of compensation. With these caveats in mind,
it may be useful to consider just satisfaction as a rough proxy for the severity
of violations. This raises the question: which types of cases do NGOs focus
on, as illustrated by the amounts granted by the ECHR in just satisfaction?
Comparing cases that led to minimal and to special NGO attention can
provide meaningful insight. Table 2 presents this data together with the
figures for the entire group of cases that led to NGO reports.53
Table 2: Amounts of Just Satisfaction in Judgments that Led to Special
NGO Attention
Sum of Just Satisfaction
(in Euros)
None
Less than 1,000
1,000-10,000
10,001-100,000
More than 100,000

All Cases Leading
to NGO Reports
13.87%
3.65%
35.04%
35.77%
11.68%

Minimal NGO
Attention
9.26%
3.70%
38.89%
35.19%
12.96%

Special NGO
Attention
10.53%
5.26%
13.16%
50.00%
21.05%

In cases with more than 10,000 Euros in just satisfaction, there is a
tendency for those cases with special NGO attention to involve higher just
satisfaction than cases with minimal NGO attention. This difference is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.54

concerning these articles are not statistically significant (P values of 0.3495 and 0.3142, respectively). In
contrast, the difference regarding Article 14, which is more common in cases of special NGO attention,
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (P value of 0.0066).
53. For an analysis of the harms compensated for by just satisfaction, see OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST
SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 98–121 (2015). The court has
especially wide discretion in determining non-pecuniary damages. Id. at 121. To provide a sense of the
amount of just satisfaction typically granted by the ECHR, the median sum awarded for the most severe
violation, violation of the right to life under Article 2, is around 20,000-30,000 Euros. See id. at 128.
Compensation for inappropriate detention conditions is often less than 10,000 Euros. Id. at 129.
54. P value of 0.0338. However, comparing the relative part of cases with more than 100,000 Euros
just satisfaction in cases that led to minimal and to special NGO attention does not yield statistically
significant results (P value of 0.3922).
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The analysis so far supports the view that reputational sanctions are not
merely a source of annoyance, but rather focus on issues of real concern. Yet
the question remains whether the cases that draw the attention of NGOs are
also cases of greater legal importance.
B. The Legal Importance of the Case
Cases involving severe violations are not necessarily legally important.
A case could address the most terrible human rights violations and at the
same time involve no novel legal argument. In fact, important cases can
address relatively mild human rights violations. For example, the ECHR’s
Von Hannover case55 that addressed the permissibility of publishing
paparazzi pictures of the princess of Monaco is a very important case because
of its innovative legal analysis of the proper balance between privacy and
freedom of the press. However, the violation this case addresses isn’t severe
compared to the cases the ECHR regularly handles.
Establishing the legal importance of a case seems like a tricky task—
one that requires great doctrinal skill and legal understanding. Fortunately,
there are many good proxies for the importance of cases, some of which are
addressed in this sub-part.
1. HUDOC Categorization
The HUDOC database divides cases into four levels according to their
importance: Case Reports, and Importance Levels 1, 2, and 3. Case Reports
cases are selected for official publication. They are usually the most
important cases in terms of their legal significance. Level 1 cases are
unpublished cases that contributed significantly to the development,
modification, or clarification of the ECHR’s case law. Level 2 cases are of
medium importance; they do not make a significant contribution, but go
somewhat beyond mere application of existing case law. Level 3 cases are
cases of low importance; they merely apply case law and do not change it.56
Cases that led to NGO reports are more likely to be categorized as either
Case Reports57 or as Level 1 cases.58 While most of the cases the ECHR
decides are in the Level 3 category of importance—merely applying the
law—more than half of the cases that led to NGO reports are published or
55. See generally Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
56. See EUR. CT. OF H.R., HUDOC USER MANUAL 11–12 (2012), http://www.echr.coe.int/Docume
nts/HUDOC_Manual_2012_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YA4-792D].
57. P value of less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference).
58. P value of less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference). The cases that led
to NGO reports are obviously even more likely to be categorized in these two categories (case reports
and Importance Level 1) taken together (statistically significant difference, P value of less than 0.0001)
than cases in the general population.
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contribute significantly to the court’s case law and are therefore classified in
the Case Reports or Level 1 categories.59
The data also suggest that cases that draw special NGO attention are
usually more important than cases that draw minimal NGO attention—they
are significantly more likely to be categorized as Case Reports60 or Level 1
cases61—indicating that NGOs focus more attention on important cases.62
2. The Size of the Panel
Given that only cases of extreme legal importance are decided by the
Grand Chamber,63 another method of measuring a case’s importance is to
check if the case was decided by a Chamber or by a Grand Chamber. In the
general population, only 0.81% of the cases were Grand Chamber judgments
while 99.19% were Chamber judgments.64 Contrast that with the cases that
led to NGO reports. There are 137 cases in the group. Only one of them was
issued by a Committee of three judges and was excluded from the analysis.65
Excluding this case, the group included 15.33% (21) Grand Chamber
judgments66 and 83.94% (115) Chamber judgments. The difference between
the groups is statistically significant.67 This supports the conclusion that a far
greater proportion of the cases that led to NGO reports involved questions of

59. The importance levels of cases in the general population were divided as follows: Case Reports
(1.56%); Importance Level 1 (2.70%); Importance Level 2 (17.25%); and Importance Level 3 (78.49%).
From 5,584 cases in the general population, the cases divided as follows: 87 Case Reports; 151
Importance Level 1 cases; 963 Importance Level 2 cases; and 4,383 Importance Level 3 cases). Contrast
that with the distribution of the cases that led to NGO reports: Case Reports (31.39%); Importance Level
1 cases (18.98%); Importance Level 2 cases (35.04%); and Importance Level 3 cases (14.60%). Those
percentages represent, from a total of 137 cases that led to NGO reports, 43 Case Reports; 26 Importance
Level 1 cases; 48 Importance Level 2 cases; and 20 Importance Level 3 cases. The differences are clear.
60. P value of 0.0008.
61. P value of 0.0124. The difference between the proportions of cases in these two categories
combined has a P value of less than 0.0001.
62. Cases that drew minimal NGO attention were distributed as follows: Case Reports 18.52%;
Importance Level 1 cases (9.26%); Importance Level 2 cases (44.44%); and Importance Level 3 cases
(27.78%). Cases that drew special NGO attention were distributed as follows: Case Reports (52.63%);
Importance Level 1 cases (31.58%); Importance Level 2 cases (15.79%); and Importance Level 3 cases
(0%).
63. See commentary, supra note 17.
64. From 5,584 cases in the general population, 45 are Grand Chamber judgments and 5,539 are
Chamber judgments.
65. All such cases are deliberately not part of the general population to exclude technical cases
issued after Protocol 14 went into force.
66. Of these cases, eleven were decided only by a Grand Chamber based on a referral by the
Chamber and ten cases were decided by the Grand Chamber after a previous Chamber decision and a
request by the parties.
67. P value of less than 0.0001.
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great legal significance that were discussed by the Grand Chamber,
compared to the rest of the cases issued by the ECHR.
Similarly, there is a significantly greater proportion of Grand Chamber
cases in the group of cases that led to special NGO attention as compared to
cases that led to minimal NGO attention.68 This suggests that NGOs focus
their attention on cases of greater legal importance, which are more likely to
be decided by the Grand Chamber.
3. Judicial Dialogue
Another proxy for a case’s legal importance is the level of dialogue
among judges. Most judgments of the ECHR are issued unanimously. But
sometimes judges dissent or write concurring opinions. These cases are
usually more legally significant; otherwise, the judges would not be in
dispute or at least would not dedicate the time necessary to write a separate
opinion. In the general population, only 10.89% of the judgments contained
at least one separate opinion. In contrast, 35.77% of the judgments that led
to NGO reports contained at least one separate opinion.69 This difference is
statistically significant.70
In cases that led to minimal NGO attention, 24.07% contained at least
one separate opinion. In cases that attracted special NGO attention, 57.89%
contained at least one separate opinion. This difference is also statistically
significant.71 These results suggest that NGOs focus their attention on issues
of special legal significance, where judges are usually more inclined to
present their views by way of a separate opinion.
4. Other Proxies for Salience
After judgments are issued by the ECHR, the CM categorizes them in
a way that will aid the monitoring of compliance. In 2012, from the 11,099
cases pending before the CM, only 1,431 (12.9%) were Leading Cases—

68. Cases that led to minimal NGO attention were divided as follows: 1.85% (one judgment) issued
by a committee (which was thus excluded from the analysis); 9.26% involved Grand Chamber judgments;
and 88.89% involved Chamber judgments. In contrast, cases that led to special NGO attention were
divided as follows: 36.84% involved Grand Chamber judgments and 63.16% involved Chamber
judgments. The difference between the groups is statistically significant (P value of 0.0032). As noted
above, the significance test excludes the case involving a judgement issued by a committee.
69. Of the 5584 judgments in the general population, 608 contained a separate opinion. Of the 137
judgments that led to NGO reports, 49 contained at least one separate opinion. Many of the judgments
with NGO reports attracted a significant number of separate opinions: 10.22% of the judgments attracted
three or more dissenting judges, while 5.11% attracted three or more concurring judges.
70. P value of less than 0.0001.
71. P value of 0.0020.
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namely, cases which raise so-called “general structural problems.”72 Contrast
that with the data on judgments that drew NGO reports: 91 (76.47%) of the
119 judgments that were still pending on January 2015 were categorized as
Leading Cases. This difference is statistically significant,73 but it is important
to note that the CM may tend to categorize cases as Leading Cases because
they drew NGO attention, which suggests a potential problem of reversed
causality.74 Of the cases that led to minimal NGO attention, 57.45% were
Leading Cases. Of cases that led to special NGO attention, 91.18% were
Leading Cases. This difference is statistically significant.75
It may be useful to compare judgments that drew minimal NGO
attention to judgments that drew special NGO attention according to their
propensity to lead to interim resolutions by the CM. Interim resolutions are
the primary way for the CM to direct reputational sanctions against
recalcitrant states. It is reasonable to assume that this tool is reserved for
issues that are of the highest concern to the CM; therefore, if cases with
interim resolutions draw increased NGO attention, this may suggest that
NGOs focus on severe violations. Only 7.41% of the cases that drew minimal
NGO attention led to one interim resolution. None of the cases in this group
led to more than one interim resolution. In contrast, in cases that led to
special NGO attention, 10.53% led to one interim resolution, 7.89% led to
two interim resolutions, and 5.26% led to three interim resolutions. If the
propensity to generate at least one interim resolution is compared within the
two groups, the difference between them is statistically significant.76 This
understates the difference, of course, as the data reveals that only issues with
special NGO attention sometimes led to more than one interim resolution.
Despite the apparent difference, it is important to caution that the CM may
decide to issue interim resolutions based on the shaming efforts of NGOs or
72. In 2011 this figure is roughly the same—from 10,689 cases pending there were 1,337 (12.51%)
Leading Cases.
73. P value of less than 0.0001. This significance test is unique: It does not refer to the general
population of judgments referred to throughout this Article but instead to cases categorized by the CM as
explained above. Furthermore, because of the very large sample, a different statistical test was used this
time—Chi-square with Yates correction. In this case, Chi squared equals 400.429 with one degree of
freedom.
74. Some of the cases that led to NGO reports were closed by the CM and are therefore not
categorized either as a Leading Case or not. An additional 20.17% of the cases that led to NGO reports
were grouped with another Leading Case; in this group of cases, though the case may not be the prime
representative of the structural problem, it is related to a problem that led to another Leading Case.
75. P value of 0.0010. Seven judgments that led to NGO reports (5.11%) are Pilot Cases. Five of
them are cases with special NGO attention, and none of them is a case with minimal NGO attention.
These cases not only involve a structural problem—the problem is so severe or widespread that the court
issued a specific decree detailing how the state should act to remedy it. This novel procedure has only
been used in a handful of cases in the court’s history.
76. P value of 0.0355.
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on the behavior of the state itself, which could, in turn, also be affected by
NGO reports. In fact, several NGO activists insisted in interviews that the
CM issued an interim resolution because of the reports they filed and the
pressure they exerted on it to monitor state compliance.77 Therefore, causal
connections here are murky.78
C. Conclusions on the Focus of NGO Attention
The preceding sub-parts provide evidence that NGOs focus their efforts
on cases that expose severe violations and that are legally important. This
supports the view that reputational sanctions are meaningful. The agents
imposing these sanctions by shaming wrongdoers do not focus on trivial
matters. They are concerned with important issues of human rights.
III. WHICH TYPE OF STATES DRAW THE MOST NGO
ATTENTION?
Are reputational sanctions targeted primarily against states that
typically fail to comply with human rights norms, so-called “low-reputation
states”? Or, do sanctions target states with a reputation for enforcing human
rights standards, so called “high-reputation states”? A finding that for every
case issued against a high-reputation state there is a greater chance that
NGOs will file reports than for a case issued against a low-reputation state
would support the hypothesis that reputational sanctions focus primarily on
states with a high reputation.79
A. Measuring States’ Reputation
Before addressing the question of which states are usually targeted by
reputational sanctions, it is first necessary to categorize states according to

77. This information (and all other interview-related information in this article) is derived from
interviews conducted by the author. The author agreed not to mention interviewees by name and that
transcripts of the interviews will not be circulated. As such, any and all assertions remain unverified by
the editor. Skype Interview: NGO activist 8, (May 20, 2015); Skype Interview: Official at the Russian
Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
78. Another method to check the concern of the CM is the decision to direct a case to the enhanced
supervision track instead of the standard supervision track. Only cases that require greater monitoring
attention or urgent action, or that involve serious structural problems, are reviewed under enhanced
supervision. Of the forty-seven cases with minimal NGO attention that were still pending on January
2015, thirty-three (70.21%) are under enhanced supervision. Of the thirty-four cases with special NGO
attention still pending at the time, twenty-five (73.53%) are under enhanced supervision. This difference
is not statistically significant (P value of 0.8066).
79. If all reports are focused on low-reputation states, this would imply that they are the most
vulnerable to such accusations. If many but not all reports are focused on low-reputation states, this does
not necessarily imply that high-reputation states are immune from reputational sanctions; after all, lowreputation states are responsible for an immense majority of the violations.
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their levels of reputation. But any such attempt is subject to accusations of
bias. Many people probably have some intuitions about which countries
abide by international law and which ignore it most of the time. But these
intuitions can be wrong. They could result from stereotypes rather than from
real data. In contrast, information about a state’s level of democracy,80
freedom,81 or corruption82 may be quite accurate, but it may have little to do
with the state’s propensity to comply with international law.
To measure the actual tendency of states to comply with the ECHR—
as a useful substitute for the elusive perceptions of the international
community about these states’ behavior that really constitute their
reputation—this Article constructs a new metric.83 This metric is developed
by gathering data on six different facts relating to states:
1. The number of pending cases allocated to a judicial formation
on December 31, 2012.84
2. The number of judgments finding at least one violation in
2012.85
3. The number of judgments finding at least one violation between
1959 and 2012.86
4. The number of cases pending at the CM (supervising
compliance) in 2012.87
5. The number of Leading Cases pending at the CM in 2012.88
80. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY RANKING, http://democracyranking.org/ (an example of an organization
that provides an annual ranking of all country-based democracies. This organization tests the strength of
each country’s democracy based on one political dimension and five non-political dimensions: (1) gender
(socio-economic and educational gender equality); (2) economy (economic system); (3) knowledge
(knowledge-based information society, research and education); (4) health (health status and health
system); and (5) environment (environmental sustainability).
81. See FREEDOM HOUSE, https://www.freedomhouse.org/ (independent watchdog agency that
publishes analysis of the state of political liberties and civil rights in nations across the world).
82. See Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparen
cy.org/country (organization that investigates corruption in countries around the world and publishes an
annual Corruption Perceptions Index).
83. Part V investigates reasons why the beliefs held by the international community about states’
behavior may be wrong or systematically biased. Despite these potential risks, which Part V argues are
somewhat alleviated by the nature of the human rights community, the actual behavior of the state remains
the best possible proxy for its reputation.
84. Data from EUR. CT. H.R, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 150 (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documen
ts/Annual_report_2012_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R4C-M5FF].
85. Id. at 154–55.
86. Id. at 158–59.
87. COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – 6TH ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 2012, 45–47 (2013), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchSer
vices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680592ac8 [https://perma.cc/UA9F-7S5X].
88. Id.
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6. The number of pending cases awaiting confirmation of
payment of just satisfaction at the end of 2012.89
All of these indicators aim to address the states’ human rights practices
that are detected by the international community and thus translate into the
states’ reputation. Each indicator is designed to counter the biases of the
other measures. The number of judgments that find violations seems like a
good measure of compliance with the Convention, but it is exposed to the
accusation that the court itself is biased in favor of some states and against
others and is consequently likely to find certain states in violation more
often.90 The number of cases filed against states may counter this potential
bias, yet it is possible that applicants target more cases against states that are
disfavored by the ECHR, thereby improving their chances of victory.
Finally, the last three measures aim to assess the compliance of states with
the ECHR’s judgments themselves, rather than compliance with the
Convention. The number of cases as well as the number of Leading Cases
awaiting compliance at the CM are both relevant measures, as they address
both the raw number of applications and a good proxy for the number of
structural problems that led to Leading Cases. Non-payment of just
satisfaction is an additional indicator of unwillingness to comply.
All indicators are highly correlated with one another;91 suggesting that
they all reveal the same quality: the general willingness of a given state to
comply with international law. This quality is presumably perceived by the
international community and forms the state’s reputation.
For each indicator, the forty-seven countries comprising the Council of
Europe were divided into five groups. The ten countries with the best
practices are categorized as 1, the next ten as 2, etc. The last group—the
states with the worst practices—includes only seven states. After states
receive a number with respect to each metric, the six numbers are averaged
and the result rounded to the nearest whole number to obtain the state’s final
reputational score between 1 and 5—where 5 indicates the states with the
worst reputations.92 This proxy of the state’s reputation may not be perfect,
but it comes as close as possible to an objective measure of any given state’s
willingness to comply with international law.
89. Id. at 57–59.
90. See generally Dothan, supra note 25 (arguing that the ECHR is more willing to find lowreputation states in violation of the Convention compared to high-reputation states).
91. The CORREL function in Excel was used to calculate the correlation between the propensity of
states to be in one of the groups (1–5) mentioned in the next paragraph, according to each one of the six
indicators. The lowest correlation was between indicators 1 and 6 (66.8%). The average of the correlations
between all possible pairs of indicators was 80.9%.
92. There are fewer states in the 5 group for each metric, making this score a potent signal of the
state’s bad practices.
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The information on states with reputation levels 1 and 2 can safely be
disregarded. First, very few cases involving these states have been brought
before the ECHR—less than 3% of the cases in the general population, as
table 5 below shows. This provides no real opportunity to file NGO reports;
indeed only one case that led to NGO reports involved a state of reputation
level 2, and no such case involved a state of reputation level 1. Second, the
populations of the countries with reputation levels 1 and 2 are very small.
Some of these countries can be credited with a high reputation level because
they usually comply with their Convention obligations, but many just have a
miniscule citizenry and fewer occasions for violations.93
Excluding countries with reputation levels 1 and 2 from the analysis
leaves only the comparison between eight states with reputation level 5,
which can be called “low-reputation states,” and twenty-three states with
reputation levels 3 and 4, which can be called “high-reputation states.”
This empirical metric is consistent with long-held views about the
nature of states in Europe. It is telling that Russia, Poland, Turkey, and
Romania which were nicknamed the “Big Four”—because they are known
for being responsible for the most cases before the ECHR94—are all coded
as low-reputation states. Most of the other results of this metric sit well with
intuition and with less systematic methods to address the behavior of states
in Europe.95
B. The Connection Between State Reputation and NGO Applications
A quick glance at the states that led to NGO reports appears to support
the hypothesis that NGOs focus on low-reputation states. Countries with low
reputations are indeed targeted by most of the NGO reports filed. However,
these countries are also responsible for most of the judgments that the ECHR
has issued. Table 3 summarizes data on the number of judgments against
different types of states and the corresponding number of judgments against
them that led to reports.

93. Of the sixteen countries in reputation levels 1 and 2, six have a population smaller than half a
million. The country with the smallest population is San Marino, with just 32,000 citizens. The average
population of all states in levels 1 and 2 is 3,354,125 and their combined population is just 53,666,000—
smaller than the population of Germany or the United Kingdom, which both have a reputation level of 3.
Population Figures by Country, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/
population-by-country.htm [https://perma.cc/H6S2-79WW].
94. See Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights: The Past, The Present, The
Future, 22 AMER. U. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2007).
95. See SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 239–42 (2015) (analyzing data about the human rights compliance of states in
Europe without developing a systematic metric of states reputation).
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Table 3: The States, Their Reputations, the Judgments Issued Against
Them and the Judgments that Led to Reports

Reputation
Level
3
1
3
3
4
3
3
5
4
2
4
1
2
3
4
3
3
5
4
1
2
5
3
1
3
1
2
4
1
2
2
1
5
4
5
5
1
4

State
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Republic of
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian
Federation
San Marino
Serbia

Number of
Judgments
– General
Population
23
2
25
57
37
40

Percentage
of
Judgments
– General
Population
0.41%
0.04%
0.45%
1.02%
0.66%
0.72%

Number of
Judgments
with NGO
Reports
1
0
9
0
13
1

Percentage
of
Judgments
with NGO
Reports
0.73%
0
6.57%
0
9.49%
0.73%

19
247
90
14

0.34%
4.42%
1.61%
0.25%

2
8
4
0

1.46%
5.84%
2.92%
0

55
6
15
57
126
28
66
241
123
3
2
229
38
0
37
13
22

0.98%
0.11%
0.27%
1.02%
2.26%
0.50%
1.18%
4.32%
2.20%
0.05%
0.04%
4.10%
0.68%
0.00%
0.66%
0.23%
0.39%

1
0
0
0
5
4
0
3
1
0
1
3
1
0
1
0
0

0.73%
0
0
0
3.65%
2.92%
0
2.19%
0.73%
0
0.73%
2.19%
0.73%
0
0.73%
0
0

123
2
14
11
8
395
58
584

2.20%
0.04%
0.25%
0.20%
0.14%
7.07%
1.04%
10.46%

3
0
0
0
0
21
0
5

2.19%
0
0
0
0
15.31%
0
3.65%

899
1
51

16.10%
0.02%
0.91%

23
0
3

16.79%
0
2.19%
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3
4
3
2
2

3
5
5
3
Total:

Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
The former
Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia
Turkey
Ukraine
United
Kingdom

[Vol 27:141

109
50
37
13
31

1.95%
0.90%
0.66%
0.23%
0.56%

0
1
2
0
0

0
0.73%
1.46%
0
0

61
1046
424

1.09%
18.73%
7.59%

0
9
3

0
6.57%
2.19%

73
5605

1.31%
100.38%

10
13896

7.3%
100.73%

To provide a clearer view of the types of states that NGOs focus on,
Table 4 groups states according to their levels of reputation. The table
illustrates the proportion of judgments in the general population that are
targeted at states of every reputation level, and the corresponding proportions
in cases that led to NGO reports.
Table 4: The Proportion of Judgments and the Judgments that Led to
NGO reports Conditioned on the States’ Reputations
State Average Level
of Reputation

Percentage of
Judgments from
General Population

1 (Disregard)
2 (Disregard)
3 (High Reputation)
4 (High Reputation)
5 (Low Reputation)

0.63%
2.18%
12.00%
12.77%
72.80%

Percentage of
Judgments that
Led to NGO
Reports
0%
0.73%
22.63%97
22.63%
54.73%

Ratio of Judgments
with Reports to
Judgments in the
General Population

1.89
1.77
0.75

Judgments that led to NGO reports are more likely to be issued against
96. Seven reports concerned a single judgment—M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No.
30696/09, EUR. CT. H.R. (2011). This case is coded here twice, once as a Greek case and once as a Belgian
case. Besides the data in Tables 3 and 4, the case was coded as addressing only Greece, which is the more
direct applicant. The applicant in this case is an asylum seeker. The court found that the conditions of his
detention in a Greek holding center and living conditions in Greece violated Article 3 to the Convention.
Belgium violated Article 3 by the act of transferring the applicant to Greece—certainly a more incidental
violation. Furthermore, the case against Belgium, but not against Greece, was closed by the CM on
December 4, 2014. CM/ResDH (2014)272. Judgments addressing more than one state are rare but
sometimes exist. This explains why the number of judgments leading to NGO reports and the judgments
in the general population of cases sum to more than 100%.
97. Or 21.90% when M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is coded as addressing Greece alone. See id.
21.90% is the figure used for the significance test. This choice makes proving the hypothesis that highreputation states are subject to more judgments harder (and consequently its proof more convincing)
because Belgium is a high-reputation state and Greece is a low-reputation state.
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high-reputation states and not low-reputation states compared to judgments
in the general population. In fact, only 24.77% of the judgments in the
general population address high-reputation states, compared to 45.26% of
the judgments in the group that led to NGO reports. This difference is
statistically significant.98 This demonstrates that NGOs are more likely to
direct their efforts toward cases issued against high-reputation states than
against low-reputation states.
It is now possible to check the amount of attention NGOs devote to
cases conditioned on the state’s reputation.
Table 5: The Attention NGOs Devote to Cases Conditioned on the
States’ Reputation
State Average Level
of Reputation

Percentage of
Judgments that Led
to Minimal NGO
Attention

Percentage of
Judgments that
Led to Special
NGO
Attention

1 (Disregard)
2 (Disregard)
3 (High Reputation)
4 (High Reputation)
5 (Low Reputation )

0%
0%
18.52%
25.93%
55.56%

0%
2.63%
26.32%
18.42%
52.63%

Ratio of Judgments
with
Special Attention
to Judgments with
Minimal
Attention

1.42
0.71
0.95

When the likelihood of judgments that led to special NGO attention to
be directed at high-reputation states and not low-reputation states is
compared to the corresponding likelihood in judgments that led to minimal
98. P value of less than 0.0001 (comparing reputation levels 3 and 4 combined to reputation level
5, and excluding reputation levels 1 and 2). This highly significant result occurs despite the fact that the
test includes data from all the low-reputation states examined including Poland, a clear outlier. Poland is
responsible for 7.07% of the judgments in the general population, but 15.31% of the judgments with NGO
reports. Despite being a low-reputation state, it therefore shows a special propensity to attract NGO
reports. This propensity, the reason Poland is such an outlier, may be that Poland showed remarkable
willingness to cooperate with the CM—a factor which, as explained in the next sub-part, may
independently explain the willingness of NGOs to file reports against a state. Out of the 21 judgments
against Poland that led to reports, Poland responded to all NGO reports concerning a judgment in 71.43%
of the cases and to some of the reports in an extra 4.76% of the judgments. This contrasts sharply with
the corresponding figures in all the judgments that led to NGO reports: 37.96% and 11.68%. 4.76% of
the judgments against Poland resulted in action reports filed within 6 months of the judgments becoming
final and another 80.95% included action reports filed after that time. In all the judgments, the first figure
is slightly higher, 13.14%, but the second is much lower—60.58%. Furthermore, 19.05% of the
judgments against Poland were closed by the CM by January 2015, while in all the judgments that led to
NGO reports the corresponding figure is 13.14%. Including Poland in the pool tilts the results against the
hypothesis—towards greater perceived vulnerability of low-reputation states like Poland to NGO
attention. That the results are still significant without excluding Poland testifies to their strength.
As a further robustness check, another test was conducted, comparing the data on all non-reputation
level 5 states to the data on states with reputation level 5. The result remains statistically significant (Pvalue of less than 0.0001).
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NGO attention, no significant difference emerges.99
C. Alternative Explanations For the Focus of NGOs on High-Reputation
States
This sub-part considers alternative explanations for NGOs’ greater
likelihood to file reports against high-reputation states, apart from an
inherent preference of NGOs for targeting this type of states. Excluding these
potential explanations can help determine if NGOs usually target highreputation states beyond the unique framework of the DEJ website
procedure.
1. Willingness to Reply to NGO Reports
States are allowed to formally respond to NGO reports. Their responses
are attached to the report and published in the same file on the CM’s
website.100 States often choose not to respond. A potential reason for the
focus of NGOs on high-reputation states is that high-reputation states have
functioning democratic institutions that are more likely to take NGO reports
seriously and reply to them. If state institutions are likely to respond to NGO
reports, this could supply motivation for NGO intervention, because this
response creates an opportunity for the NGO to engage in a dialogue with
state administrators and to shape their behavior.101
A reply does not necessarily indicate that the state is willing to make
sacrifices to clear its good name. A state may choose the easy course of
replying to accusations that garnered attention instead of amending its ways
for the future. Indeed, although some government responses try to refute the
accusations lodged against the government by offering countering data,
others are technical and easily performed. For example, when the Russian
Federation was faced with a report accusing it of abducting a person and
forcibly transferring him to Uzbekistan, all its representative wrote in
response was that the relevant application “was forwarded to the competent
state authorities. In order to verify the statements set out in the application
99. P value of 1.0000.
100. States sometimes file communications that refer and respond to NGO reports filed a long time
before (see for example the communication of the Polish government filed on Oct. 6, 2014 in response to
Report (2014)1055 filed on Aug. 22, 2014). For the sake of consistency, such responses were not coded.
Only responses formally attached to a report, which—besides in a few very early cases—are joined in the
same pdf file, were counted.
101. On the other hand, acting through the CM may be the only way to communicate and receive
information from low-reputation countries like Russia, which is otherwise unlikely to collaborate with
NGOs. This fact was stressed in an interview with an official at Russian Justice Initiative conducted on
June 1, 2015. Even if low-reputation states reveal less information to the CM than do high-reputation
states, NGOs may still attempt to draw low-reputation states to respond to the CM, because otherwise
they would get no information at all.
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the inquiry is currently in process. Further information will be promptly
submitted when the relevant data is received.”102 Such evasive responses are
easily produced and certainly do not prove that the state is willing to
undertake costly measures to protect its reputation.
Table 6 measures the tendency of states to respond to NGO reports
issued against them conditioned on the states’ reputation.
Table 6: States’ Responses to NGO Reports Conditioned on the States’
Reputation
Reputation Level

1 (Disregard)
2 (Disregard)
3 (High Reputation)
4 (High Reputation)
5 (Low Reputation)

Respond to
All NGO
Reports
0%
0%
46.67%
38.71%
34.67%

Respond to Some
NGO Reports

No Response to NGO
Reports

0%
0%
20.00%
9.68%
9.33%

0%
100.00%
33.33%
51.61%
56.00%

When the tendency of high-reputation states to respond to at least some
of the NGO reports filed against them in a specific case is compared to the
corresponding tendency in low-reputation states, the difference is not
statistically significant.103 Similarly, when the tendency of high-reputation
states to respond to all reports filed against them in a specific case is
compared to the corresponding tendency of low-reputation states, the
difference is also not statistically significant.104 The data do not suggest any
reason to believe that NGOs focus their efforts on high-reputation states
because they are more likely to reply to their accusations than are lowreputation states.
2. Willingness to Cooperate with the Committee of Ministers
States may differ in their willingness to cooperate with the CM by filing
action plans—a plan for how they are about to comply with the judgments
issued against them—or action reports: a report of the measures already
taken to comply. States can demonstrate special willingness to cooperate by
filing this plan on time, within six months after a judgment becomes final.105
As argued in the last sub-part, differences in states’ willingness to file action
reports raise the possibility that NGOs may prefer to intervene in cases

102. NGO Report (2013)720.
103. P value of 0.1676.
104. P value of 0.3781.
105. Miara & Prais, supra note 29, at 531. The terms “action plan” and “action report” are used
interchangeably here—they both describe documents submitted by states to explain how they are
complying or how they will comply with the judgments against them.
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against states that cooperate with the CM in this way, thereby providing
NGOs with a visible impact on state behavior.
Writing an action report and undertaking the necessary work to
complete it also provides NGOs access to information that may make filing
NGO reports easier. In fact, NGOs often write reports that respond to and
criticize claims by states in their action reports. A report filed by the Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights on February 26, 2014 is a good example.106
This report is more than twenty pages long, and primarily casts doubts on
and critiques claims made by Poland in the action report it filed in response
to the Trzaska group of cases107 concerning excessive length of pre-trial
detentions.
Table 7 displays information about states’ tendency to file action
reports in cases that led to NGO reports conditioned on the states’ reputation:
Table 7: Filing Action Reports Conditioned on States’ Reputations
Reputation Level

No Action Report
filed

1 (Disregard)
2 (Disregard)
3 (High Reputation)
4 (High Reputation)
5 (Low Reputation)

0%
0%
16.67%
29.03%
29.33%

Action Report Filed
Later Than 6
Months After Final
Judgment
0%
100.00%
70.00%
48.39%
61.33%

Action Report Filed
Within 6 Months
From Final
Judgment
0%
0%
13.33%
22.58%
9.33%

When the tendency of high-reputation states to file action reports is
compared to that of low-reputation states, the differences are not statistically
significant.108 Differences in states’ tendency to file action reports on time
are not statistically significant either.109 Therefore, the data do not suggest
that NGOs focus on high-reputation states simply because they are more
likely than low-reputation states to cooperate with the CM.
3. Willingness to Comply with Judgments
Another factor that NGOs may take into account is the willingness of
states to comply with the ECHR’s judgments that garnered NGO attention.
Compliance may indicate that a state cares about the reputational sanction
attached to its misbehavior and is willing to sustain the costs of compliance
to avoid this reputational sanction. Nonetheless, a state may also comply

106. NGO Report (2014)356.
107. See Trzaska v. Poland, App. No. 25792/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) (unpublished), http://hudoc.ech
r.coe.int/eng?i=001-58750.
108. P value of 0.4395.
109. P value of 0.2026.
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with a judgment without changing its behavior in other areas. NGOs may
still have an incentive to file reports against states that usually comply with
ECHR judgments subject to such reports, because this allows NGOs to claim
they played a role in facilitating state compliance.
If a state complies fully with an ECHR judgment, the CM will close the
case. This is the strongest possible indication of full state compliance. Table
8 presents data on cases that led to NGO reports that were closed by the CM
until January 2015.
Table 8: Cases Closed by the Committee of Ministers
State Average Level of
Reputation
1 (Disregard)
2 (Disregard)
3 (High Reputation)
4 (High Reputation)
5 (Low Reputation)

Cases Closed by January
2015
0%
0%
23.33%
9.68%
9.33%

Cases Still Pending as of
January 2015
0%
100.00%
76.67%
90.32%
90.67%

The difference between the proportion of cases closed in highreputation states and in low-reputation states is not statistically significant.110
There is, therefore, no reason to suspect that NGOs focus their attention on
high-reputation states only because these states are likely to quickly comply
with ECHR judgments that draw NGO attention.
4. NGO Past Involvement
Another possible factor affecting the results may be that NGOs were
involved in the case at initial stages by filing amicus curiae briefs, and then
followed up on the case by filing reports regarding noncompliance. The
possibility that NGOs are interested in monitoring compliance in cases they
participated in as friends of the court, or even as legal representatives of the
applicants, is certainly intuitive; NGOs that already acquainted themselves
with the information pertaining to a certain issue—and moreover staked their
reputation on their success to change state practice on this issue—are likely
to monitor compliance with the judgment.111 Furthermore, some NGO
officials stressed that it is considered bad practice in the NGO community to
get involved in cases that were first litigated by other NGOs without their
permission.112 Others emphasized that following a case through and making
sure the judgment is implemented is part of their holistic strategy of initiating

110. P value of 0.2977.
111. See Shai Dothan, Luring NGOs to International Courts: A Comment on CLR v. Romania, 75
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 635, 643–44 (2015).
112. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
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social change.113 Still others said that if they represented applicants, they
view themselves as obligated to ensure that the judgment they received will
be implemented as fully as is feasible. This is simply part of the service they
provide.114
This conjecture is also confirmed by the data: out of the twenty-six
cases in the pool of cases that led to NGO reports that had an NGO who
submitted an amicus curiae brief, fifteen cases included at least one report
by at least one of the NGOs who were involved as a friend of the court. The
other eleven cases included reports filed only by other NGOs. Considering
the number and diversity of potential NGOs, these figures are revealing.
NGOs often participate in cases informally by sending their lawyers to
represent applicants or even funding legal assistance by external lawyers.115
However, this type of informal participation is much more difficult to track
and to quantify than participation as a friend of the court, which is regularly
mentioned in the body of the judgment.
The data suggest that NGO involvement as third parties does not
explain the practice of filing more NGO reports against high-reputation
states than against low-reputation states. Out of seventy-five cases that
concerned low-reputation states, ten (13.33%) included NGOs as friends of
the court. Out of sixty-one cases that concerned high-reputation states,
fifteen (24.59%) included NGOs as friends of the court. The difference
between the propensities of high-reputation states and low-reputation states
to attract the involvement of NGOs as amicus curiae is not statistically
significant.116 The claim that NGO involvement as third parties explains
patterns in the filing of NGO reports is therefore not supported by the data.
113. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015).
114. Phone Conversation with Lawyer, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (June 25, 2015).
115. See, e.g., P. and S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-114098 [https://perma.cc/3ZMH-3RY6] (where lawyers from the Center for Reproductive
Rights assisted with the representation of the applicants). The Center for Reproductive Rights later filed
a report concerning this case. See LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EUROPE 55–56 (2011) (suggesting that a large part of the involvement of NGOs in ECHR proceedings
is informal).
Another possibility worth mentioning is that an NGO would serve as an applicant itself. See, e.g.,
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.i
nt/eng?i=001-99221 [https://perma.cc/WK3C-LPSS] (where the applicant is itself an NGO). In this case,
the applicant NGO didn’t file a report, but other NGOs did. In contrast, in the case of Genderdoc-M v.
Moldova, App. No. 9106/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111394
[https://perma.cc/4HMB-Q84S] the applicant is an NGO who later filed a joint report with another NGO.
116. P value of 0.1196. Notice this compares both data on friends of the court that filed reports and
data on those that didn’t file reports, that is, when only other NGOs filed reports. The reason is that this
test assumes that filing the amicus curiae brief by itself generates an incentive for the NGO who filed the
brief to file a report later on, as could other forms of intervention that may not be visible from the case.
To complete the picture, only seven (11.48%) cases in high-reputation states and seven (9.33%) cases in
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5. A Concentration of Severe and Important Violations in HighReputation States
Finally, there exists a potential alternative explanation that is largely
non-intuitive: maybe there is a greater proportion of cases that involve severe
violations or important legal issues concerning high-reputation states than
low-reputation states. As Part II shows, NGOs focus their attention on severe
and important cases. If high-reputation states commit on average more
severe violations or lead to more important cases, maybe this is the reason
why they face more NGO reports.
It is unlikely that the cases directed at high-reputation states involve, on
average, more severe violations. This possibility can be checked by
comparing the proportion of ECHR judgments among the general population
finding severe violations in low-reputation states and in high-reputation
states. In fact, there are proportionally more cases involving violations of
Articles 2, 3, and 13 in low-reputation states,117 and these differences are
statistically significant.118 This is consistent with the simple intuition that
low-reputation states are generally responsible for more severe violations.
On the other hand, there are proportionally more Article 14 violations in
high-reputation states.119 This difference is statistically significant as well,120
suggesting that high-reputation states may be especially prone to unlawful
discrimination between individuals, or at least are more often accused of
such practice.121
High-reputation states also draw a greater proportion of important
cases. 0.97% of the cases filed against low-reputation states in the general
population of cases are classified as Case Reports, and 2.11% are classified
as Importance Level 1. The corresponding figures for high-reputation states
are 4.31% and 5.09%. When the propensity to generate either Case Reports,

low-reputation states have a report by an NGO who submitted itself an amicus curiae brief. This
difference is not statistically significant (P value of 0.7796). It is also possible that NGOs may be
influenced by other NGOs’ participation: namely, NGOs may be motivated to file reports by the
involvement of other NGOs as friends of the court. All this leads to the hypothesis that the reports against
high-reputation states are caused by a greater propensity of NGOs to file amicus briefs vis-à-vis these
states. Yet, since no such propensity appears in the data, the hypothesis is rejected.
117. In low-reputation states, 7.16% of the judgments found Article 2 violations, 17.74% found
Article 3 violations, and 11.09% found Article 13 violations. In high-reputation states, the respective
figures are: 1.86%, 25.69%, and 9.16%.
118. P values of less than 0.0001 for Articles 2 and 3, and a P value of 0.0296 for Article 13.
119. In low-reputation states, 1.01% found Article 14 violations. In high-reputation states, the
relevant figure is 3.59%.
120. P value of less than 0.0001.
121. Note that for this calculation, judgments in the general population directed against two states
that include a violation were counted twice (even if the judgment found a violation was committed only
by one state). Because these cases are very rare, this should not affect the result.
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Importance Level 1 cases, or cases of these two categories combined is
compared, all these differences are statistically significant.122
This raises a question: is it the importance of the cases filed against
high-reputation states that explains their greater propensity to attract NGO
reports? To answer this question, the importance levels of cases that actually
led to NGO reports can be compared. 26.67% of the cases that led to NGO
reports filed against low-reputation states are Case Reports cases and 22.67%
are categorized as Importance Level 1. The figures for high-reputation states
are 36.07% and 14.75%. When comparing the propensity of a case to be
categorized at the highest level of importance (Case Reports) or at the two
highest levels combined (Case Reports and Level 1), no statistically
significant differences appear.123 Therefore, while high-reputation states
may indeed usually draw more important cases, this difference cannot
explain the fact that they are subject to more NGO reports, since cases that
led to NGO reports do not significantly differ in their importance between
high and low-reputation states.
To complete the picture, it is possible to compare the severity of cases
that led to NGO reports in low-reputation states and in high-reputation states.
This test can help refute a more distant possibility—although high-reputation
states are generally responsible for less severe violations (besides issues of
discrimination under Article 14), perhaps they are responsible for more
severe violations discussed in cases of a special quality (such as legal
importance) that usually draw the attention of NGOs. The only article
indicating severity that is more common in high-reputation states is Article
14, but the difference concerning this article is not statistically significant.124
In contrast, the tendency of low-reputation states to generate more violations
of Articles 3 and 13 that led to NGO reports is statistically significant at the
0.1 level.125 An additional test for a violation’s severity is the amount of just
satisfaction issued in the case. Comparing the just satisfaction issued in cases
that led to NGO reports in low-reputation states and in high-reputation states
does not find statistically significant differences.126

122. All three comparisons lead to P values of less than 0.0001.
123. P values of 0.2663 and 1.0000, respectively.
124. Of the cases filed against low-reputation states that led to NGO reports, 16.00% concerned
Article 2 violations, 34.67% concerned Article 3 violations, 26.67% concerned Article 13 violations, and
10.67% concerned Article 14 violations. In cases filed against high-reputation states, 9.84% concerned
Article 2 violations, 19.67% concerned Article 3 violations, 13.11% concerned Article 13 violations, and
16.39% concerned Article 14 violations.
125. Article 3 – P value of 0.0576; Article 13 – P value of 0.0580.
126. In low-reputation states, 16.00% of the cases that led to NGO reports involved just satisfaction
of more than 100,000 Euros, and 50.67% involved just satisfaction of more than 10,000 Euros. In high-
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The data suggest that judgments discussing severe violations of the kind
that is likely to draw NGO reports are not more commonly issued against
high-reputation states than against low-reputation states. Perhaps the
opposite is correct. It seems only natural to conclude that there are more
severe violations committed by low-reputation states that led to NGO
reports, although the data are not very strong on this point. If reports against
low-reputation states do indeed target more severe violations, the reason may
be that low-reputation states simply commit a greater share of the most
severe violations in Europe. But it is also possible to interpret this admittedly
weak data as further support for the argument that NGOs are more willing to
file reports against high-reputation states. This conclusion can be reached
because the data suggest that NGOs are willing to extend their shaming
efforts even to less severe violations committed by high-reputation states.
The human rights standards required from high-reputation states may simply
be higher. If high-reputation states commit violations of lesser severity—that
would not lead to reports if committed by low-reputation states—they may
nevertheless be subject to reports.
D. Conclusions about the Focus of NGOs on High-Reputation States
This part presents a systematic way to divide states in Europe into highreputation states and low-reputation states. It shows that NGOs issue more
reports per judgment related to judgments involving high-reputation states
than related to judgments involving low-reputation states. This suggests that
high-reputation states are more vulnerable to reputational sanctions than
low-reputation states. Several alternative explanations for NGOs’ tendency
to focus on high-reputation states specifically within the DEJ procedure were
examined, but none of these explanations finds support in the data.
IV. WHAT DO NGOS REALLY WANT?
Parts II and III present certain patterns in the issues and the states on
which NGOs focus their shaming efforts. These patterns may reveal
important insight into the nature of reputational sanctions in international
law. They may reveal, for example, when reputational sanctions cause the
most damage, and how accurate is the information transmitted by shaming
efforts. These insights are the subject of Part V. Before jumping to general
insights about reputation, though, the characteristics of the NGOs that
published on the DEJ website must be studied. By exposing the incentives
of the NGOs involved, it is possible to verify if these incentives, rather than

reputation states, the corresponding figures are 6.56% and 42.62%. The differences are not statistically
significant: more than 100,000 Euros (P value of 0.1117); more than 10,000 Euros (P value of 0.3904).
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the general nature of reputational sanctions, are responsible for the observed
patterns of NGO behavior.
A. Separating NGOs According to Size
As a first take on this problem, it may be helpful to check if NGOs act
differently depending on their size. If the core players using the DEJ website
are large, well-funded NGOs, maybe they are simply following the interests
of their patrons. Could it be that donors from rich democracies support NGOs
that focus on their own countries of origin because of the donors’ liberal
commitments? If this bias is strong enough, the greater wealth and larger
human rights community in high-reputation states may very well explain the
focus of NGOs on this type of states.
Yet the data shows that big NGOs are actually responsible for a very
small part of the reports filed on the DEJ website. The world-wide NGO
Human Rights Watch is only responsible for addressing a single case. Even
the global mega-organization Amnesty International was involved in filing
reports in only seven cases. Liberty is an NGO focused on human rights in
the United Kingdom, but at the same time, some consider it to be the most
frequent litigator before the ECHR.127 Yet despite its involvement at the trial
phase, this major NGO was involved in reports addressing only one case.128
No less telling is the fact that in all the cases targeted by reports from these
three major players, other NGOs also filed the same or other reports.
Furthermore, even this miniscule sample of reports by the big three
organizations is evenly divided between four cases concerning highreputation states and four cases concerning low-reputation states.129
This suggests that the community of NGOs is actually incredibly
diverse. More than two hundred organizations, big and small, domestic,
European, and global in focus submitted reports and took part in the efforts
to shame states for noncompliance. In this open and teeming community,
fears of a centralized strategy orchestrated by a few tycoons or stemming
from the wealth inequalities between European states can be alleviated.

127. See HODSON, supra note 115, at 107.
128. It may be interesting to theorize about the reasons large organizations filed so few reports.
Perhaps these reports are used only by organizations that cannot make an impact in another way. Perhaps
the large number of workers at large NGOs, each with her own specialty, prevents one person for having
the set of skills necessary for filing a report: a familiarity both with the specific subject matter and the
machinery of the CM.
129. Amnesty International even signed a report for the only case in the sample from a “reputation
level 2” state, which is excluded from the analysis in Part III.
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B. The Incentives of NGOs
Alleviated perhaps, but not eliminated. Several conversations with
NGO activists revealed that foundations that fund NGOs have developed a
strategy to bend these organizations to their will. More and more foundations
would earmark certain funds for certain purposes such as aiding a specific
right or a specific region.130 Small NGOs need money for things as trivial as
office supplies and paying salaries. They are forced to take the directives of
these foundations seriously.131 If powerful foundations use this technique
efficiently, they could operate indirectly through countless tentacles and
sway the general attention of civil society in a specific direction.
Some foundations openly champion this strategy of operating from
multiple NGOs simultaneously. The European Program for Integration and
Migration (“EPIM”) even takes centralization up a level. It is a collaboration
of thirteen European foundations that work together to strengthen civil
society organizations. EPIM does not only give grants; it also organizes
workshops and funds professional training for NGOs to build their
knowledge and capacities. Furthermore, it supports networking between
NGOs to facilitate mutual learning and collaboration.132 Another major
network of NGOs, created in 1994, is the Human Rights House Network. It
unites ninety NGOs in Europe and Africa that cooperate with one another in
an effort to improve their effectiveness.133 Though the different NGOs are
independent, the secretariat of this large network, based in Oslo, can
doubtlessly exert substantial influence on the actions of civil society across
Europe and beyond. Some wealthy countries, especially Scandinavian
countries, do not operate solely through foundations. Rather, they directly
fund NGOs supporting causes they care about.134
To address the possibility that centralized power lies behind the
observed patterns in NGO behavior, it is vital to talk to NGO officials and
see what it is they really aim at achieving, taking their commitments and
constraints into account.
This much seems clear from the interviews: high-reputation states
cannot expect an especially lenient treatment because of their status. One

130. Foundations differ in how strictly they monitor spending, but often reports of spending must be
quite accurate. Skype conversation with NGO Lawyer 10 (June 12, 2015).
131. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015).
132. See About EPIM, EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR IMMIGRATION AND MIGRATION, http://www.ep
im.info/ [https://perma.cc/LZ7D-WY9X].
133. See About the Human Rights House Network, HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE NETWORK,
http://humanrightshouse.org/noop/page.php?p=HRHN/index.html&d=1 [https://perma.cc/BM5W-SRS
S].
134. Skype interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015).
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NGO lawyer suggested that if a violation was proven against a state, then,
by definition, it behaves imperfectly and should not be granted any favors by
NGOs.135 Another NGO lawyer stressed repeatedly that even the most highly
acclaimed democracies commit violations and crimes.136 Interviewees
focused on the need to make a difference in the world. This suggests that the
most energy should not be dedicated to the best behaving states—they
behave well anyway—nor to the worst behaving states—they are unlikely to
change their behavior in any case—but instead to states located somewhere
in the middle. That is, states that commit violations, but could be pressured
to correct them.137
NGO activists who focus on high-reputation states stress that their
government is often receptive to criticism. For example, an official at
Association Nationale d’Assistance aux Frontières pour les Étrangers
(“ANAFE”)—a French NGO assisting foreigners at the border—said that
lawyers and officials in France care about ECHR judgments and change their
practices to avoid future violations. ANAFE built a reputation as an expert
on migration, and French bureaucrats learn from it and communicate with it
directly. For ANAFE, NGO reports like those studied in this Article, serve
as a complementary method to communicate indirectly with French officials.
This method carries beneficial results on the ground as state officials learn
from the reports and change their behavior.138
This stands in sharp contrast to the conditions NGOs face in lowreputation states. A Romanian NGO lawyer confessed that he did not believe
NGO reports have any direct impact on Romania, which replies to their
reports in an utterly unhelpful manner. Instead, the NGO’s strategy is to exert
pressure on the CM in the hope that the CM would, in turn, pressure the
Romanian government.139 In Russia, NGOs singled out the CM machinery
as the only effective way to get information from their government. Russian
officials do not communicate with NGOs. Consequently, activists can only
get the data they need to pursue further legal action by acting indirectly
through the Strasbourg system.140 While in other countries, such as
Lithuania, NGOs are in direct contact with their government delegations to
the CM,141 Russian NGO lawyers speak to delegations of other countries at

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015).
Skype interview with NGO Lawyer 11 (July 3, 2015).
Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015).
Telephone Interview with Official, ANAFE (May 27, 2015).
Skype Interview with Romanian NGO Lawyer 9 (May 25, 2015).
Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015).
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the CM to urge them to criticize Russia in the CM’s closed meetings. Such
efforts may have led to interim resolutions against Russia.142
So far, it seems that NGOs’ focus on high-reputation states is justified
by the willingness of these states to change their practices due to criticism,
which, in turn, directly relates to the value they put on their reputation. But
the picture is more complex than that. In low-reputation states, NGOs are
often subject to effective national measures meant to suppress their activity.
NGOs in Russia—at least those which receive money from abroad or engage
in actions such as advocacy that involve foreigners—are forced by law to
declare themselves as “foreign agents” in all their official documents. This
designation carries a powerful stigma, something akin to calling yourself a
spy. Furthermore, NGOs are subject to daily acts of harassment by countless
forms of bureaucratic hurdles. They have to submit numerous forms and be
subject to frequent inspection. Add to that a public sentiment that views
human rights activity as a form of foreign intervention and as a reason for
Russia’s financial problems and you have a potential reason for the relative
paucity of NGO actions vis-à-vis Russia.143
Russia and other states coded here as having low reputations are not
alone in their actions against NGO activity. In Azerbaijan, civil society
activists are subject to false arrests, to unjustified searches, and even to
violence. Furthermore, the government funds so-called GovernmentOrganized
Non-Governmental
Organizations
(“GONGOs”)—
governmentally controlled organizations built and funded for the sole
purpose of infiltrating and corrupting the human rights community. 144 In
other post-communist countries, such as Serbia, there is simply no culture of
philanthropic investment in fighting for the public interest.145 This is a
striking difference from countries such as the Netherlands where, with a
population of less than 17 million, Amnesty International alone boasts
255,000 members and over 560,000 volunteers.146 Cultural differences and
differences in government practice may certainly affect the results found in
this Article. Furthermore, the procedure investigated here is relatively new

142. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
143. Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015). Another NGO official admitted
that Russian counter-measures proved effective in leading some Russian NGOs to keep a low profile in
the media. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
144. In Azerbaijan as the Last Remnants of Democracy are Being Destroyed, Some Watch in
Silence), MEYDANTV (Oct. 29, 2014) http://www.meydan.tv/en/site/society/3532/In-Azerbaijan-asthe-last-remnants-of-democracy-are-being-destroyed-some-watch-in-silence-(part-2—%E2%80%9CG
ONGO%E2%80%9Dids).htm [https://perma.cc/38QT-B3TW].
145. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015).
146. Amnesty International the Netherlands, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.nl/en
glish [https://perma.cc/R6V2-B4Y4].
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and many NGOs in low-reputation states may simply be unaware of it.147
This, however, may also be true for NGOs in high-reputation states.148
Despite these caveats, one cannot ignore the fact that there are still
numerous NGOs that do target low-reputation states. Many of them, in fact,
are based in other countries and collaborate with local organizations. To
understand NGO activity, one must consider not only the organizations’
constraints, but also the goals that NGOs are trying, often successfully, to
achieve. NGO activists stress that they are committed to making a social
change.149 They insist that they care about actual results, not about the
reputation of their own institution.150 If others can do the work better, so they
say, they would let them take the credit for it.151 This attitude explains why
NGOs try to cooperate with as many other NGOs as possible in pursuit of a
common cause.152
But this may be an overly complacent view. NGOs are not just trying
to make the world better by any means possible. First, many NGOs have a
specific mandate set in advance. For example, the Lithuanian Gay League
fights for equality regardless of sexual orientation in Lithuania, not for other
worthy causes or for rights in other countries.153 Second, NGOs try to prevent
an overlap with other organizations and to do things others are not doing.154
Most importantly, NGOs compete for a limited amount of funds from a
limited number of grants and foundations. This is a recipe for jealousy and
competition. Some activists voiced resentment toward bigger NGOs that win
large grants by investing the money they receive in internal administration
and leaving the actual work to smaller NGOs which struggle for survival.155
Others insist that NGOs mark their territory and get upset when others
intervene—for example, by filing reports in cases they initiated.156
None of this detracts from the fruitful cooperation that does exist
between NGOs. NGO activists help each other to form connections and to
collect information.157 They meet one another in conferences158 and in joint
147. Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015).
148. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015).
149. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015).
150. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015).
151. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015).
152. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 8 (May 20, 2015).
153. See Mission and Goals, ASSOCIATION LITHUANIAN GAY LEAGUE, http://www.lgl.lt/en/?page_id
=116 [https://perma.cc/8GPU-ZFHM].
154. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015).
155. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015).
156. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015).
157. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015).
158. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 8 (May 20, 2015).
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training sessions where they engage with other people they could turn to for
advice in the future.159 Language barriers sometimes make NGO
collaboration difficult, so do differences in institutional culture, such as the
unequal time it takes to reply to an email.160 NGOs struggle to collaborate
despite these challenges. At the same time, NGOs engage in other forms of
collaboration. While there are NGOs that simply send reports as letters to the
CM,161 others have a fruitful cooperation with its members.162 While some
NGOs do not use the media because they deal with less salient issues,163
others actively try to shape public policy by using the media.164
To conclude, despite facing different challenges, NGOs in highreputation states and in low-reputation states are both adapting their
strategies to the realities they are facing. Generally speaking, NGOs are
committed to social change, even if some of their policies are mediated by
self-interest. Criticizing high-reputation states is likely to be more successful
because state officials care about the reputation of their country and are
willing to work hard to preserve it. Consequently, a focus on high-reputation
states is only to be expected. Some low-reputation states care so little about
their reputation that they are even willing to launch a public battle against
the human rights community, despite the inevitable reputational costs that
such a policy entails.165
V. IMPROVING REPUTATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
The analysis of states’ reputation so far collects data on the behavior of
states and on the shaming efforts against them. In contrast, states’ reputation
is actually a belief of the international community about the states’ past
behavior—their failure to comply with ECHR judgments—that can help
predict their future behavior: their propensity to fulfill their international
obligations.166 This belief is plagued by uncertainty on two accounts:
information about the nature of the states’ actions is ambiguous and the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Skype Interview with NGO Activist 5 (May 15, 2015).
Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015).
Skype Interview with Romanian NGO Lawyer 9 (May 25, 2015).
Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015).
Telephone Interview with Official, ANAFE (May 27, 2015).
Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015).
See Miriam Elder, Russia Raids Human Rights Groups in Crackdown on ‘Foreign Agents’, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/27/russia-raids-human-rightscrackdown [https://perma.cc/J2FZ-TGH2] (citing foreign officials’ and NGOs’ criticism of Russian
policies in this regard).
166. See Gregory D. Miller, Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,
12 SECURITY STUDIES 40, 42 (2003) (using a similar definition of reputation as: “. . . a judgment about
an actor’s past behavior that is used to predict future behavior”).
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judgments formed by spectators of the states’ actions may be biased. This
Article addresses these problems in turn.
A. Imperfect Information Makes Every Deed Count
NGO reports are primarily a method of exposing information about
states’ compliance with ECHR judgments. But even strong and committed
NGOs do not have access to all of the necessary facts. They must form
impressions based on partial and imperfect information, and these
impressions may certainly be wrong.
Furthermore, even if the facts of the matter are clear, they may still be
subject to interpretation. The ECHR often issues judgments that require
several types of measures: paying compensation for damages, undertaking
specific measures to redress the violation, and making general legal changes
to amend the root cause of the violation.167 If a state complies with some of
these dictates, but not with others, it is unclear whether it should be branded
as failing to comply with its obligations.
The problems of dealing with partial compliance are demonstrated in a
report filed against the government of Azerbaijan by the Media Rights
Institute, a NGO based in that country. The report concerned how Azerbaijan
complied with judgments that found it violated the right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Convention when it imprisoned certain
journalists for defamation.168 The NGO noted that the journalists whose
rights were violated received full compensation and were released from
prison. Yet at the same time it stressed that these journalists were pardoned
and not retried, and that the legal changes attempted by Azerbaijan did not
suffice to prevent future violations.169 Calibrating the level of Azerbaijan’s
compliance is a complex matter. It requires not only surveying the facts, but
also making difficult value judgments.
Another problem with detecting compliance is how to treat delay in a
state’s actions.170 When states are required to undertake structural changes
to their legal system, they never comply instantaneously, nor are they
expected to. But what constitutes a reasonable delay? After how long can
observers deduce a state is truly unwilling to comply with a judgment? And

167. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 528.
168. DH-DD(2013)971, Communication from a NGO (Media Rights Institute) (12/09/2013) in the
cases of Mahmudov and Agazade and Fatullayev against Azerbaijan (Apps. No. 35877/04 and 40984/08)
(2013).
169. Id.
170. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 28 (2005).
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if a state complies after this point in time, what does this say about its
reputation?171
The uncertainty shrouding states’ reputations runs even deeper than
that. States build their reputation by signaling not only to NGOs but
primarily to other states that they are willing to sustain certain costs in order
to maintain their reputation for the future. No one expects states to suffer
limitless costs. Even a state that cares deeply about its reputation will only
comply if the reputational sanction it will suffer by noncompliance is greater
than the costs entailed by compliance. The problem is that there is no way
for NGOs to observe the true costs of compliance for the state.
The actual costs of compliance are unobservable because when the
court requires complex legal measures, undertaking them can lead to all sorts
of consequences. If the state is required to release prisoners, for example,
compliance may damage deterrence of certain crimes. It may also lead to
public opposition to the government from certain groups in society. If a
government is required to change its laws, doing so may jeopardize its policy
goals in a variety of ways. Furthermore, compliance with a judgment has an
expressive function, which creates its own costs. States may perceive
compliance as an acknowledgment of guilt that has reputational
consequences. In contrast, they may view compliance as exonerating the
state from guilt for the initial violation by paying the price that legitimizes
its actions.172 Finally, state compliance sets a precedent for its behavior, a
precedent it may be pressured to follow in the future at its own cost.173
If the costs of the state were observable, only the most demanding
judgment a state complied with would count as a signal, because it indicates
the limit of what the state is willing to pay to preserve its reputation.
Compliance with less demanding judgments would signal nothing new about
the state’s reputation.174 In contrast, because real costs of compliance are
unobservable, there is always a possibility that a certain judgment costs more
171. If a state complies after a long time, it may have already endured severe reputational damage
only part of which can be rebuilt by noncompliance. The state’s willingness to shoulder the costs of
compliance for this partial rehabilitation of its reputation indicate that it views the reputational sanction
as particularly large and should therefore signal its high reputation. At the same time, the state’s
reluctance to comply earlier on should serve as a negative reputational signal. Moreover, if as time passed
conditions changed and made compliance less costly, as is often the case, the belated compliance should
count as a weaker signal of the state’s good reputation.
172. Cf. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (2000)
(describing how people sometimes view fines as a price the payment of which erases all guilt for the
initial transgression).
173. See DOTHAN, supra note 95, at 30–32.
174. See ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS – A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 83
(2008) (arguing that if a state behaves according to prior expectations, this may affirm its reputation but
would not change it).
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than the state was previously willing to pay. As a result, every action of
compliance sends a signal that increases the state’s reputation. But although
the international community cannot know for sure how demanding
compliance would turn out to be, it certainly has assessments about the costs
of compliance. Compliance with a judgment that appears more demanding,
even if its compliance costs cannot be perfectly calibrated, would lead to a
much higher reputational boost than a judgment that appears to require only
cheaper actions.175
The reputation of states is therefore flexible. A state’s actions—or,
more accurately, the stipulations of actors in the international community
about these actions—constantly change the state’s reputation for better or for
worse. It seems reasonable to assume that as these stipulations multiply, the
state’s reputation would lead to increasingly better predictions of the state’s
conduct. Mistakes and exaggerations by different actors about the state’s past
conduct would offset one another, and the true character of the state would
gradually be revealed.
In a community composed of states and their leaders, an additional
mechanism may improve the assessments of states’ reputation even further:
states will acquire a reputation for reliability in their accusations against
other states. As the network between the states develops to include strong
multiple ties, states will learn which states they can trust to tell the truth about
the conduct of other states. As states learn to ascribe differing degrees of
credibility to stipulations on other states, their assessments of the reputations
of these states will constantly improve.176
B. Opening the Shaming Community to Prevent Echo
The analysis so far describes a network that sociologists define as
complying with the so-called “bandwidth hypothesis”: the network
resembles a pipe through which information is transmitted; the denser the

175. See DOTHAN, supra note 95, at 19–20 (suggesting that although states gain a lot of reputational
capital from compliance with a demanding judgment, this judgment usually indicates that the state
initially committed a severe violation, which could damage its reputation. This Article, however, is
focused only on the conditions prevailing after the violation already occurred and the judgment against
the state was issued. At this point in time, state’s conduct can rebuild its reputation by compliance or
damage it by noncompliance).
176. Reliability is an asset that can serve states in the long term, but it involves costs in the short
term, such as investing in data gathering and facing up to difficult and unpopular truths. Therefore, states
with low discount rates—which are also likely to have high reputations for compliance with international
law, as argued in Part VI—are going to be considered generally more reliable. The quest for reliability
and the quest for compliance reputation intertwine; as states pursue both, they have an incentive to lead
international opinion on other states’ reputations in the right direction.
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network, the wider the pipe and the more accurate information becomes.177
But sociologists also speak about a competing hypothesis, a hypothesis that
unfortunately may more accurately represent the tension existing between
states in the Council of Europe. It is called the “echo hypothesis” and it
argues that information flow within a dense network is not enhanced but
rather corrupted. As actors report the actions of others, they do not say the
whole truth and nothing but the truth. Instead, they are biased by their prior
dispositions as well as the dispositions of the actors with which they
interact.178 For example, states may be predisposed to think of states with
low-reputations as bad actors. Therefore, when they describe their actions,
they will paint them in negative colors. These biased reports will then be
echoed by other predisposed states, and the reputations of the accused states
will plummet. In this example, in contrast with the data uncovered in this
Article about the activity of NGOs, high-reputation states stand to gain from
the echo effect because reports about their behavior will usually be positive
and drive their reputation upwards.
Sociologists run complex tests on networks to determine whether they
comply with the echo hypothesis or the bandwidth hypothesis. Devising such
tests for the multifaceted diplomatic interactions of states seems nearly
impossible. But there is another, more sinister factor that creates a real
danger for an echo effect in the Council of Europe. This factor is the fact that
states which accuse other states may suffer painful political repercussions.
Sadly, states are not only committed to the protection of human rights within
and outside their borders. When a state critiques another state, the ties
between the two are almost universally damaged. States that want to
maintain their friendship with the accused state are also likely to shun the
accuser. States may also use accusations to attack their enemies, contributing
their share to the corruption of the system of reputation.
The Council of Europe is a close-knit community. In such a community,
formal accusations are likely to be rare, because no state wants to damage its
international ties.179 After all, such a process was already attempted: states
can bring cases against other states in the ECHR system according to the
Convention. But this process led to very few cases, many of which were

177. See RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CAPITAL
167–68 (2005).
178. See id.
179. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 60–61
(1991) (describing a similar close-knit community of farmers in the Shasta County where close ties
usually prevent farmers from bringing each other to court).
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plainly political pay-backs,180 suggesting that powerful states or states with
apparently high-reputations may not be subject to any shaming efforts by
other states even if they commit human rights violations.
In contrast, powerless and low-reputations states may be subject to
repeated accusations, some of which will likely be false or exaggerated.
Accusations against such states can start from purely egotistical motives, as
a way for states to distance themselves from the accused state and to curry
favor with its adversaries. Once accusations start, they may echo and
multiply. As states share information about the accused state, they reinforce
each other’s predispositions and their views are amplified. The result of this
process is that when states interact with each other in a closed system, the
reputations of states will be pushed to extremes: either very low or very high
reputation, depending on what can be a relatively arbitrary starting point.
A different way to frame this problem is to recognize the potential for
a so-called “cascade” of views. Cascades occur when members of a group
change their opinions by following others. Reputational cascades occur
when group members are pressured to follow each other to avoid reputational
loss. Informational cascades occur when group members try to learn from
each other’s decisions to improve their own policies.181 Both types of
cascades may materialize here: states may feel a reputational pressure to
conform to the underlying beliefs about the conduct of other states, and they
may also use information provided by other states to make their own opinion.
As states start to follow other states, which in turn followed other states, they
may be driven further and further away from what an unbiased and
independent judgment would reveal. An arbitrary or malicious accusation
may be endlessly repeated and destroy a state’s reputation beyond repair.
Another distortion that can occur when states deliberate among
themselves over the actions of other states results from the limited pool of
arguments—such as specific or general accusations—available within the
group of deliberating states. If states are only exposed to a skewed pool of
assessments regarding a certain state—which, for example, views that state
as a bad actor—the process of deliberation will push the assessments of that
state to greater and greater extremes.182

180. See supra notes 13–14; see also Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in
International Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 254
(1988).
181. See Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 161–63
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 78
(2000); see also generally CASS. R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK
TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER (2015).
182. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 89–90.
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These potential distortions in the formation of states’ reputation suggest
that leaving it to the states to control the information on the conduct of other
states may not be a good idea. To depoliticize this system, the community
should be expanded to actors that have less to lose from saying the truth.
This is where NGOs enter the picture. NGOs are not as vulnerable to revenge
by accused states. They do not have global financial and security interests
that can be easily jeopardized. If many NGOs submit reports about a state,
they are unlikely to be systematically biased by political alliances. They do
not have old scores to settle by false or exaggerated accusations, and they
have less to gain by keeping quiet in the face of injustice. If NGOs have
dispositions, they are less entrenched and less uniform than those of states
and are therefore less likely to reverberate and echo. The inevitable
inaccuracies in NGO reports are likely to balance themselves out and lead to
stable and fair reputations.
Furthermore, because NGOs are so diverse in their views and their
interests, they are likely to present assessments that are less uniform than the
ones of the states. This could prevent the exclusion of certain views or
arguments from the agenda and minimize the chances of polarizing views by
deliberation among actors with similar assessments. Unlike states, NGOs are
not part of an exclusive club, and the social ties between them are far less
pronounced than between states. Experimental evidence suggests that groups
that do not share a common identity are less likely to go to extremes than
more cohesive groups, because they can foster divergent arguments and
contain less social pressure to conform.183
NGOs possess another significant advantage: their purpose as an
institution defines a precise role for them. They are expected to criticize
states for human rights violations, unlike state representatives that have to
maneuver between a series of diplomatic challenges. Many NGOs focus
specifically on certain states, on certain types of violations, or quite often on
certain violations within certain states. This means that NGOs have narrowly
defined roles. Narrowly defined roles, known to the participants in the

183. Id. at 90–92. One way to think about this problem is through so called “threshold models.”
Imagine that every member of the group has a certain threshold—a number of accusations she must hear
from others before she issues an accusation of her own. The number of accusers one needs to hear
plausibly depends on the relationship with these individuals. Specifically, the influence of people one is
closely connected to is probably much greater than the influence of strangers. This suggests that in groups
where people are closely connected to one another thresholds are more likely to be crossed and false
rumors would spread more easily. See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83
AMER. J. SOC. 1420, 1423, 1429 (1978). The implication is that the group of state representatives who
are closely connected to one another are more likely to form strings of false accusations than NGOs who
are not so densely connected.
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dialogue, have been shown in experiments to improve the dissemination of
information within groups.184
These insights from social science again suggest that opening the arena
for the meaningful deliberation of NGOs can prevent the views on states’
reputations from polarizing in a way that is deceptive and misleading.
Admittedly, NGOs have their own sinister incentives, but some of them
work in favor, not against, the system of reputation. NGOs thrive on
publicity. They need publicity to change the world, and most of them need
publicity to raise funds and survive.185 There is nothing that helps get
publicity more than saucy gossip, and saucy gossip is usually counterintuitive.186 If an NGO can tarnish an otherwise flawless reputation, it is
guaranteed to make headlines. This is consistent with this Article’s finding
that NGOs focus their attention on high-reputation states, making reputation
so difficult to accumulate and turning it—in the manner discussed in Part
VI—into a credible signal on states’ future actions.
NGOs need publicity to catch the attention of donors, but to get them to
open their wallets they need to win their sympathy as well. This raises the
specter of NGOs that cater to the interest of powerful players: rich tycoons
or, more commonly, governments. These corrupted NGOs—that some refer
to as GONGOs187—can sometimes be even more dangerous than
governments acting in the open. They allow governments to throw mud with
impunity, hiding behind the anonymity provided by cheaply maintained
organizations. If such accusations become the norm, the high hopes of
transparency generated by NGO involvement will soon be eclipsed by a
system of veiled accusations that no state is accountable for.188

184. See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 181, at 111–12.
185. See Dothan, supra note 111. The constant struggle for publicity may affect the issues NGOs
focus on. See James Ron et al., Transnational Informational Politics: NGO Human Right Reporting,
1986-2000, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 557, 573 (2005) (suggesting that Amnesty International selected the
countries it reported on not only due to human rights conditions, but also due to so-called “information
politics.” It focused on powerful countries and on countries exposed to media coverage, among other
factors, to attract public attention and potential funds).
186. See BURT, supra note 177, at 110.
187. See Mauro Palma, The Possible Contribution of International Civil Society to the Protection of
Human Rights, in REALIZING UTOPIA – THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76, 81 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2012).
188. This raises memories of the terrible Lion’s Mouth where innocent Venetians were daily accused
by cowardly invisible enemies. See generally MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD (1869) (describing
the Lion’s Mouth: a hole in the wall used in Venice when it was ruled by the Patricians to slip notes
accusing people anonymously of plotting against the government. Many innocents were accused by their
enemies and tried in secret by masked unnamed judges that composed the Council of Three. Chances to
escape a death sentence were slim).
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This is a danger that cannot be ignored, but should not be exaggerated.
Indeed, NGOs are easily constructed, but they must struggle for years to gain
a reputation for credibility and truthfulness. NGOs that have achieved such
a reputation are unlikely to risk forfeiting it by serving states’ interests.
NGOs that did not build this reputation will not be believed by the
international community.
Furthermore, while the accusations lodged against states may not reveal
the true identity of the states that initiated the accusations—raising the
possibility that low-reputation states are secretly supporting the accusations
of NGOs against high-reputation states—these accusations are not judged in
secret. They are judged by public opinion based on a reservoir of reports that
is open to all: to contribute, to respond, and to criticize. Opening the arena
for other views minimizes the echo effect. It lets accusations compete in the
realm of ideas and arguments, where the best reports stand a fair chance of
winning. More than anything, Part II of this Article suggests that this
marketplace of ideas actually works: NGOs are focusing their attention on
severe violations and on issues of real legal importance. The system did not
spiral out of control.
CONCLUSION
The DEJ website compiles information gathered from numerous NGOs
about the compliance of states with ECHR judgments. This technological
and institutional novelty makes it increasingly easy for states to monitor each
other’s human rights behavior. It is a new reality that states collectively gain
from as it builds reputation into a useful method for predicting state behavior,
thus facilitating efficient interactions between states.
The focus on severe and important issues ensures that relevant
information about state practice is exposed. The exposure of information
ensures that significant violations by the states will not go unnoticed. This
means that states that possess high reputations earned them by compliance
with their international obligations, making the system of reputation a viable
tool for assessing states’ behavior.189
The focus of NGO attention may reveal which type of state can lose
more from reputational sanctions. Presumably, NGOs try to shame states
because they want them to change their behavior, or at least to be punished
for their bad practices. NGOs would probably not invest resources for
nothing. They would focus their attention on states that have a lot to lose

189. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
2012 (2002) (arguing that the availability of accurate information about states’ conduct is crucial, if the
participation of states in human rights regimes is to serve as an effective signal).
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from reputational sanctions against them. If that is indeed the case, then the
focus of NGOs on high-reputation states indicates that a high-reputation state
is harmed more by a similar reputational sanction than would a lowreputation state. That is good news for the international system of reputation.
In fact, this finding supports a key assumption made in the literature on
reputation. High-reputation states are often assumed to lose more from
reputational sanctions based on the intuition that when they violate
international law they act contrary to the prior expectations of the
international community and therefore cause a greater shift in these
expectations than would a non-compliant low-reputation state.190 This, in
turn, gives high-reputation states an incentive to undertake costly actions to
preserve their reputation, actions that low-reputation states would not take.
If high-reputation states suffer more from reputational sanctions than
low-reputation states, this suggests that earning reputational capital involves
constantly increasing costs. If earning reputational capital becomes
increasingly difficult as a state increases its reputation, only states that are
willing to sustain significant costs will possess high reputations. This
reputation sets them apart from the other states. In other words, it is a costly
signal of their character, and therefore a credible one.191
But what are states signaling when they incur the costs necessary to
maintain their reputation? A possible answer is that they indicate they care
more about their future international standing than they care about avoiding
immediate costs. Adherence to international law per se is important to other
states. But it is the willingness to incur immediate costs to do so that really
makes a difference for the states’ reputation. The willingness to sacrifice
benefits in the present in the hope of gaining more in the future is often
termed “low discount rate.”192 States with a low discount rate will be justly

190. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 510 (2005); GUZMAN, supra note 174, at 83; DOTHAN, supra note 95, at
13.
191. See MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND
RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 16–20 (1974) (developing the theory of signaling to counter situations
of asymmetric information); AMOTZ & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE – A MISSING PIECE
OF DARWIN’S PUZZLE XIV (1997) (studying a similar system of signals developed by evolution in the
animal kingdom. Male peacocks, for example, grow big and cumbersome tails that signal to the females
they are able to escape from predators even despite the tail’s weight); see generally Michael Spence, Job
Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
192. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002) (explaining
how states that enforce human rights protections signal their low discount rate); David H. Moore, A
Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879 (2003) (explaining how states
that comply with international human rights obligations signal their low discount rate); ERIC A. POSNER,
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 116 (2000) (explaining how everyday behaviors, such as taking the effort to
display the national flag, can signal the low discount rate of individuals).
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perceived as states that are unlikely to break their commitments in pursuit of
quick gains. Such states are considered good treaty partners and
consequently get better deals in international negotiations. These highreputation states are therefore compensated for their efforts to maintain
international law, but only in future transactions. It is the readiness to
sacrifice the present for the future that sets high-reputation states apart from
low-reputation states.193 States that are concerned about the future can be
justly perceived as good collaborators that will stay true to their word despite
occasional temptations to breach their obligations.
States that were caught violating human rights by the ECHR may lose
reputation as a result of shaming by NGOs. But they also gain a significant
advantage—they are able to respond to accusations against them and, most
importantly, they can rebuild their reputation by complying with judgments
to the satisfaction of the CM. A structured process to shape reputation is not
important just for states that conduct themselves perfectly. It also creates a
workable method of repentance—allowing states to regain reputation by
changing their behavior.194

193. See GUZMAN, supra note 174, at 35. Yet, reputation is not always a prefect tool to predict
behavior. See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and Development, in THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
117, 118 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (arguing that it is possible to predict the behavior
of states based on their reputation only in connection with agreements that are subject to similar costs of
compliance and that are valued the same or less by the states); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s
Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 249 (2009); Rachel Brewster, The Limits of Reputation on
Compliance, 1 INT’L THEORY 323, 326, 328 (2009) (voicing the concern that governments have a short
life span and will therefore not consider the long-term repercussions of their actions on their state’s
reputation).
194. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of The Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In The
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (highlighting the importance of an agreed upon
penalty to limit the reputational damage caused by a breach).

